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SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM: THEORETICAL SYSTEMIC OBLIGINGNESS IN DISARRAY

Ioana-Bianca Berna

Abstract:

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN *was born in 1967, in the breastplate of the strategic comotions of the Cold War. Originally, there were five founding members: Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Philippines. Vietnam joined the ranks in 1995, after the ultimate reverberations of the Last Indochin War. In 1997, Laos nd Myanmar followed Vietnam. In 1999, Cambodia decided to make its partaking in* ***ASEAN*** *a fact, especially after its political domestic situation received much needed handling. As important as these guidebooks are, they are involved in the scope of this article only secondarily. Thi article reports the fact that the meekness of three important theoretical anchors –* ***the security complex theory***, ***the security regime theory***, ***the collective security theory***, ***the community security theory*** *and* ***ASEANology****– instaurations utilized to explain* ***ASEAN****`s birth and predict its development, are tailored in half-abidince. Ever since its derivation,* ***ASEAN*** *became able-bodied to furnish one of the most successful forms of* ***regionalism****, after the global high-ranking position of* ***European Regionalism****.*

Southeast Asian New Security Regionalism *has plenty of theoretical orthodoxies to apply or to commence applying. The aftermath of their empirical workings can sometimes be unconfident of the very ideas it implemented. The approach of this article is to review some of the major theoretical conceptual contributions utilized to describe findings about* ***Southeast Asian New Security Regionalism's*** *connotations. While supporting the idea that neither one of the research programs mentioned is grounded enough in* ***Southeast Asian security dynamics****, the last part of the article claims that a rediscovery of* ***Southeast Asian Regionalism****, under the* ***New Regionalism*** *framework, is very likely to underplay its distinctiveness.*

Keywords: ASEAN; Regionalism; Southeast Asian New Security Regionalism.

1. Elucidation of theoretical use

Regionalism is a concept that tightly operates faddishness especially because the major signature tone of regional identifications is not the one of full agreement. For many years Southeast Asia was not identified as a region, or a sub-region. It bore the terminology associations that were given to it by extra-regional actors. From immemorial times, the Chinese have used the appellation of *the South Ocean* to

delineate the vassal theories that were neighboring its Southern-most extremities. Gradually, Southeast Asia became known as the compilation of states North of Australia, East of India and South of China. As time passed by, Southeast Asia lost the initial attrition. Succeeding, different and sometimes altering recognition phases passed before Southeast Asia could be identified with *ASEAN*.

This article does not actuate a mere geographic interpretation of *Southeast Asian regionalism*. It ranks records of its formation, compiling ideas of its history, culture and politics. It starts by amounting and discussing several theories that relegated Southeast Asian *regionalism*'s evolution and finishes with an attempt to tease out its distinctiveness by paralleling it to other forms of *regionalism*. The term *regionalism* has been utilized in this section within a conceptual toolbox: a process-tracing regional project, encompassing mutually-shared ideas by regional actors.

2. The lack of compliance of systemic theories in Southeast Asia

If theory is an appendix of reality, then the transition between reality and theory might not be so inexorable. If theory is the exemplar reflection of reality, then how can a theory reasoning different fallacies, scrutinizing understandings and fallacies that find their omnisciency unscattered proved only in the space that gave them birth, claim universality? How can the orthodoxy of Western theories be implemented into areas that bear little resemblance to the security opportunities and to the security environment into which those theories were built? Theory is the product of reality or theory is the product of reality and also produces reality? The present thesis argues that, without invoking any possible disfigurations, theory is the product of reality and produces reality. Thus, theory can cluster around a certain spread of responses that can help shape reality. If this is an accepted claim, then how can a theoretical system perceive the trends and patterns in regional affairs and attach straightforward definitions to them, if it was meant to spread ideas of a different reality? It could only underpin a systematic misreading of another reality. Cultural linkages, common historical experiences, a different intelectual setting and hubris - are evidences that theory is not monosymtomatic. Associating terms of reference that can only incompletely deliniate explanatory tools that can only half way yield un falsifiable answers. This point is also made by Amitav Acharya when it suggests that: „There is a possibility for progress in West and in non-West" (A.Acharya, B. Barry:2010).

There certainly exists a non-West reality that defies a perfect fit in reinforcing belief systems, under a Western thinking scrutiny. *ASEAN* was targeted by many Western discourses, some ascribing to partially applied Western investigatory methods, some ascribing to imputations of the Western theoretical backgrounds[1]. As it will be shown, non-West theories have a contestes nature, as applied to *ASEAN*.

[1] In our opinion, obviously abusive in means;

One of the most appraised theoretical patterns of the study of regions is the *regional security complex theory*. As one of the most viable studies of the regional security level, the *regional security complex theory* can be with total accuracy applied to *ASEAN*'s *institutional functionalism*. There are some considered assessments of evidencing some correlations. The fact that „the security dynamics is based on territoriality [...] and that it contradicts the de-territorialisation promoted by globalization"(B.Bary, O Weaver:2003) cannot completely be indifferent of *ASEAN*. *ASEAN*'s close geographic design made the processes of interaction and of cooperation to be more expeditious in nature. *ASEAN* – as a regional grouping – was built and oriented to being in full grasp of the regional reality of all the eleven Southeast Asian states. It was not its founding aim to connect and reconnect the region, in geographic terms. Despite this, *ASEAN* was able to have a geographic patronage of Southeast Asia: especially with the current talks regarding East Timor admission in *ASEAN*. Regional growth, economic interdependencies, norms-sharing under the umbrella of cooperative management – could have had their practical and smooth development and operations, if it hadn't been for the geographic proximity of *ASEAN* states. The four essential variables of security complexes – *border*, *anarchic structure*, *polarity*, *social construction* – cannot stand a total association with *ASEAN*. Combating regional anarchy was not the impending rationale of the founding fathers of *ASEAN*. There were, of course, apprehensions regarding Indonesia's dealings and regional ambitions. Nonetheless, Indonesian subliminal diplomacy and anti-Malaysia campaign did not escalate into regional conflicts. *ASEAN*, unlike the European Concert or the United Nations, did not elbow room for cooperation and mutual understanding among Southeast Asian states, after a period of violence and offensiveness – as it was the case for Europe, after the Second World War. Concealing the fundamental differences between Southeast Asian States played into *ASEAN*'s striking and self-perpetuating consensus-type decision-making. Polarity is not a sub-systemic trait in Southeast Asia. Hegemonic regional players do not exist in Southeast Asia, as opposed to other sub-regions of Asia. *The Asian Financial Crisis* proved the assertion that no Southeast Asian state the inexorable discrepancies of regional cooperation. No Southeast Asian state could have provided a lifeboat for the others or resolve socialization problems. Ralf Emmers argues that Indonesia and Vietnam are regional hegemonies in Southeast Asia – one of them exercising dominance in the maritime territorial portion of Southeast Asia, and the other in the sub-continental area. It is unarguable the fact that Indonesia had for a long time high hopes for the regional order of Southeast Asia (apud R. Emmers:2005, pag. 645-655).

It condoned a regional behavior of a tough player. Indonesia even utilized its recourses to invade East Timor in 1975. Even if it was not a rule-bending circumstance, as East Timor was not an *ASEAN* member, but a Portuguese extension into the

Indonesian mainland, Indonesia's exposure as military power defending its periphery disclosed its immanent objectives – of securing domestic order in the homeland and of eliminating external influence on its territory. It was highly improbable that Indonesia could have conducted military-like incursions into the rest of Southeast Asia. Indonesia's coercion potential could only be propagated domestically. Recollections of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia can be explained with other ends in view. Vietnam performed a protracted war with a considerable Soviet help. Cambodia, on the other side, was under the Chinese protection shield. Vietnam did not have the resources necessary to invest into such a military spree! Vietnam's status in Indochina cannot be undermined, especially after the reunification. Vietnam's status as a hegemonic presence in sub-continental Southeast Asia can flare up other discussions. This thesis does not steadily encourage any of these positions. Launching brutal assaults with foreign aid and assistance does entangle great power status for an actor. Furthermore, Vietnam's economy, even though successful in comparison to the economies of other Southeast Asian states, cannot overarch an economic ownership over a meteoritic economic rise. Indonesia could not overcome the upshots of the Asian Financial Crisis. The adjustment to the post-Crisis economic environment was painful to Indonesian ambitions.

The purported resistance to regional conflict is not an *ASEAN* feature that *the regional security complex theory* evaluates. From this theoretical angle: "*Security dilemmas are much harsher in the case of actors engaged in a relationship of territorial proximity*; *regions are mini-anarchies*; *Regions can enrich, but not revolutionize International Relations Studies*; *Regions composed of weak states characterize proto-security complexes*" (E. R. Kelly:2007, pages:197-229). *The regional security complex theory* is obviously inspired by European experience and theory. There is an almost unchallenged popular appeal of considering European feedback an all-resolving panacea. The centuries' old Eurocentric tradition of the world order entitles such enuanciations. The decolonization process and the separatism it brought between the European history, the Western history and the non-West history are poorly receives by this theory. The arguments according to which the West creates order and the non-West disorder generate sources of lingering tension between the view from without and the efforts to normalize intra-regional security environments across the globe and particularly in Southeast Asia.

The security regime theory can also be used to assess *ASEAN Regionalism*. *The security regime theory* is, likewise, European-inspired. The lack of confidence between members of a security regime clarifies the fact that an equilibrium of power can exist between its members. The members of a security regime can use detterrence methods to avoid the emmergence of conflict, other than the normative ones. The process of reciprocal interaction is not meant to produce integrationist frameworks. There are principles that have to be respected, but if these principles cannot surpass

certain incongruities between its members, then its members can use intimidating factors in order to drive out a possible unwillingness. Stability is modulated by these inflexions. In *a security regime*, members are less available to socialise[2]. Peace can only gain a widespread acceptance if the military insecurities are so high that they can best be appeased through cooperation. Peace is not a supreme goal in security regimes. Cooperation in security regimes is only a more honourable way to habituate destabilizing tendencies with norm-production actions. Cooperation is a lesser evil. If balance of power policies will cause visceral harms to the states' interests, then cooperation in the form of a security regime will be the most appropiate available option. Military rivalries might emerge. Collocations of fragile states or of powerful states might also emerge within a security regime. This security formula does not necessarily entail integration or interdependence. In this article`s point of view, security regimes are a quick fix to very complex security problems. Security regimes exclude *deeper multilateralism*. They can sometimes represent a back-up plan when *multilateralism* fails. *The Concert of Europe was a security regime* that served as a security order for Europe after the Napoleonian Wars. Before the outburst of the First World War, *the Concert of Europe* was the prevailing order in the system. In this instance, security regimes are systemic theories. Their derivative use in *Southeast Asian sub-systemic regionalism* is adumbrated by *ASEAN* normative edifice. *The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality* and the *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation*[3] bridge the gap between war-like manifestations and mistrust between *ASEAN* members. Conflict avoidance and the *communiy-type regionalism* indicate that *ASEAN* is enthused over integration processes and normative proliferation. Unlike the European security setting of the XIX century, Southeast Asia was not constantly embroiled in regional wars. Local conflicts afflicting the region happened whether between non-*ASEAN* members[4], between regional elements and extra-regional elements[5] or within the area of a regional country's domestic affairs. The rivalries of the colonial era made way for a cycle of extra-regional ignited conflicts. Even when considering the recent Thai-Cambodian conflict[6], the regional conflicts in Southeast Asia did not have the salience of the European ones. The global scale of the latter is only one thing to consider.

The Thai-Cambodian conflict was subservient to *Southeast Asian regionalism*. Member states asidously cultivated an approach to that had to be taken immediately. The general feeling was that the conflict be terminated as soon as possible. In the

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[2] Like in the *security communities*;

[3] Adopted in 1971 in order to keep Southeast Asia away from the disservice of extra-regional influence and interference;

[4] *Exempli gratia* – The Third Indochina War;

[5] *Exempli gratia* - The First Indochina War; the post-war Dutch- Indonesian clashes;

[6] Which emerged over the Preah Vilhear Temple in 2008, with violent encounters in 2011;

Thai-Cambodian conflict, the agressor was hard to identify. On the forefront of events, regional states wanted a fast ending to the issue, thinking that the supervening economic cooperation would also become strained. *Southeast Asian regionalism* had a more lucrative effect, in this respect, than security regimes. There was no *regional coalition of the fittest* against one or the other of the belligerent parties. There were no – registered or unregistered – disrespect towards a belligerent party. All of the regional approaches were sanction-free. *Southeast Asian regionalism missed the opportunity to use balance of power in the Thai-Cambodian conflict*. As far as the economic facet of security regimes is concerned, the main assumptions rest untouched – as Steven Krasner suggests that „principles, norms, rules and decision making around which actor expectations converge in a given-issue area" (S.D. Krasner:1982) sum up the main aspects of security regimes. Norm convergence matches *Southeast Asian Regionalism* in economic terms. Regulating economic *Southeast Asian Regionalism* involves more than a normative examination. Well-informed contributions of consensus-reaching procedures, sectoral cooperation, standardized cooperation, prohibitive norms of behavior - estimate how far Southeast Asia has come in creating an *ASEAN Economic Community*.

Collective security theory sometimes intersects with scholar evaluations of *ASEAN*. In *collective security theory*, pledging allegiance to a common cause is what is required of the member states. Member states share the same security DNA – they can ressort to violence if one of them is attacked. Responsibilizing the attacker is the common denominator for collective action. The attacker is recognized under this quality by all the member states of this kind of security arrangement. The member states' cooperative disposition is activated during imperative circumstances. Thus, cooperation is circumstantial! The evolution of new functions for the member states is not compulsory. The enemy and its aggressive actions are not seized in advance. Agresiveness emits from attitude and behavior. There are many cons to these claims. First of all, *ASEAN Regionalism* was not dismissive of external influences, but they did not amount for all of *ASEAN*'s security positions. If was *ASEAN*'s security objective was only to avoid communist disturbances in Southeast Asia, then the end of the Cold War would have made its presence retrograde. Second, *ASEAN*'s military profile was not conceptualized in the beginning[7]. Its echoes are of a very and undeveloped recent nature. *ASEAN* finds it difficult to find culprits for the small-scale, regional conflicts it has to manage. Launching a punitive attack against an aggresor would mean that *ASEAN* is equipped with needful and substantial capabilities alongside. *ASEAN*'s founding fathers moved, at first, to the creation of joint-economic issue areas. Economy was the layer that thickened multilateral cooperation in other areas,

[7] Even with the advent of *ASEAN Security Community*, things do not seem to run into the direction of ever being properly conceptualized;

even when *ASEAN* was moderately institutionalized. Even if state-centrism cannot be overlooked in Southeast Asian *regionalism*, *ASEAN* remains the dominant supplier for *ASEAN regionalism*. This is explanatory for the fact that the sphere of economic - cooperation as the primordial premises for *ASEAN regionalism* – was not exchanged with other premises, but was amplified into them!

Security communities theory is also given a theoretical dimension when discussing *ASEAN regionalism*. *Security communities* emerge on a synthesis of interests. Linkages increase the prospects for peace and for frameworks' predictions. Conflict avoidance is replaced by a peace-seeking structure. Peace and conflict avoidance are not synonyms. Conflict-avoidance is only a stage in the peace-making process. The convergence of interests is what secured the region against outsiders. A climate of trust, of amity and of welfare is revealed by a security community. The absence of war does not mean that states always agree on every issues. In *a security community*, states agree to have the possibility to sometimes disagree, without disengaging from the common perspective. The sense of solidarity between the members of *a security community* is very important in war-prevention actions. States rely on each other to protect and convey each other's interests. In *security communities*, there is no interest balancing. States do not balance against each other and are not virtually open to outer interventions. Their actions inside *the security community* are value-based. Value-sharing is not the same thing as norm-sharing. Norms enshrine a behavior under a constraining emulation. Values imply a cultural liaison between the members of *a security community*. Security relationships inside a security community are more likely to accelerate transition and security dynamics if they are value-oriented. One of the many virtues of *security communities* is that the level of trust is so high that values overrun norms.

Karl Deutsch was the patriarch of *the theory of security communities*. His theory helped provide an exemplification of the difference between *peace as a process, and not as an ultimate aim* and *peace as a product and as an ultimate aim* (K. Deutsch:1957). Transnational cooperation appears when states trust each other so much that greater inter-state interdependence comes naturally. The most important pillars of a security community are: *the absence of war* and the *absence of preparations for war* (A. Acharya:2010). Karl Deutsch inferred also a theoretical division of security communities: *amalgamated security communities* – created through the fusion of different states and *pluralistic communities* – in which interdependence and sovereignty are portioned equally. *ASEAN* takes after the deutschian interpretation of security arrangements. The absence of war in regional negotiations is not only instrumental, but also empirical. *ASEAN* consensual bone structure embodies the desire that even a conflict of interests has to be avoided if regional peace is craved for. *ASEAN*'s inclusion in the second category of *security communities* – *the pluralistic communities* - stresses *ASEAN*'s background expectations: *bilateral*

security arrangements are a wide acceptable assumption like *multilateral security arrangements*. *ASEAN*'s vision of *regionalism* is, by this fact, very pragmatic. The security arrangements are interchangeable, even if, as regional experience unfolds, *multilateralism* is the preferable selection. If this selection mode happens to not work properly, then bilateral security arrangements would make for their seizure. Karl Deutsch's approach is *transactionalist*: "the guiding hypothesis of transactionalist work on integration was that a sense of community among states would be a function of the level of communication between states" (B. Rosamod:2000) *ASEAN Regionalism* did not attain such a progress. *ASEAN*'s decisions have an informal precursor and the mutual constitution that sovereignty is a liability that cannot be renounced at. The dominant belief system that communication is the critical attribute of *security communities* is not coordinated with *ASEAN*'s closed undisclosed communication processes[8].

ASEAN's demise as *a security community*, in a deutschian sense, happened when the Thailand-Cambodia conflict was unleashed. Under no circumstances can two states that prepare for war[9] and declare war to each other, call themselves pertaining members of *a security community*. Subtilities of this theoretical approach can be deciphered. Karl Deutsch used the *transactionalist security model* to explain how North Atlantic institutional devices were gaining momentum. Events in the North Atlantic security environment spiralled in a way contrary to Deutschian prophecies. The French withdrawal from NATO in 1959 tainted what seemed to be the perfect image of solidarity. The Thai-Cambodian conflict tainted an almost accomplished dream!

Another worthwhile theorizing attempt of *ASEAN* is made by David Martin Jones. The scholar depicts *ASEAN Regionalism* under the terminology of *ASEANology* (J.D. Martin:2006). Like the aforementioned authors, David Martin Jones compares *ASEAN* paradigm with a systemic theoretical counterpart. This time a comparison is drawn between *ASEAN* and the USSR. David Martin Jones observes that *ASEAN*'s worshippers failed to predict the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998. In the same line of argument, supporters of *Sovietology* failed to prevent USSR's global downfall and moments of crisis that superseded the superpower[10]. To his mind, a theory has to have the ability to act in a prophylactic manner and be able to warn the political elites of major turning points that are about to happen. *ASEAN*'s propaganda in the pre-crisis period is contested in the same degree like the Soviet propaganda. The theoretical mainstream's emulation fueled positive outcomes in both cases. No single theoretical key had the courage to predict the disaster. David Martin Jones' formulations are too far-fetched! Compared to the USSR, *ASEAN* did

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[8] Secret diplomacy disables clearer explanations of decision-making;

[9] Even if at a very small scale;

[10] David Martin Jones utilizes the Popperian algorithm for empirical testing of a theory: *Explain/Predict/Test*;

not vanquish in the post-Cold War Era. The crisis that deviated *ASEAN Regionalism* involved regional and extra-regional components. The responsibility to predict had to do with both of these auspices. *ASEAN* is the epitome of Southeast Asia, with a strict geographic delimitation. The USSR had no geographic delimitations in projecting its influence and power. A large-scale downfall cannot hold comparison to a sub-systemic downfall. *ASEAN* specialists did not predict the forthcoming crisis, but they did not deny such an occurrence. Compared to the USSR, *ASEAN* did not overstretch its means and resources. *ASEAN* employed its resources strictly for the regional build-up. USSR employed its resources globally and made the mistake of contingently preserving them at the widest of scales. The mirroring of the two experiences is discontinuous.

The systemic theories outlined in this sub-section sketch out a series of misgivings when channeled to explain the on-goings of *ASEAN*'s security reality. Amitav Acharya also incorporates the first of them in his book: *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia- ASEAN and the problems of regional order*. The reason behind their meltdown in Southeast Asia is that they uncomfortably ignore the distinctiveness of *Southeast Asian Security Regionalism*.

3. The Distinctiveness of Southeast Asian New Security Regionalism

Research conducted on regional security dynamics in Southeast Asia has found new sources of inspiration. The uni-polar momentum has faded and the regional security level is no longer an available place for testing extra-regional involvement (apud B.Buzan, A.Amitav:2010). The theories of the precedent sub-section imprint additional references of systemic thinking – a surging tide of European, American and Soviet theorizing contexts. The familiarity of these writings to Southeast Asian political development is diffusely verified. Southeast Asian social dynamics, security evolution and regional security shifts were arbitrated in a different manner than the theories that envisioned the security policies and behaviors of the actors that assigned a recognizable security pattern to the international system.

At a certain moment in time, extra-regional actors – systemic forces or plainly extra-regional actors whose spheres of interest were visible in Southeast Asia – used sheer power projection to inflate regional affairs. It was the period of the Cold-War – when peripheries were centrally-managed and coordinated. Global interventions were the main modifiers of the regional security dynamics and a self-propelled regional order was, by all means, an unthinkable hypothesis. The main argument was, that, ever since Westphalia, the systemic level has exerted a strategic dominance over the sub-systemic level. The relationship between the primary system and the regional subsystems was a relationship of *subordination*. *Southeast Asian Regionalism* had to pay homage to *ASEAN*. The ascending *ASEAN Regionalism* began its journey to maturity during the Cold War's security twist and turns. It did not receive

help from the outer-regional circle, even if the outer-regional circle purposefully influenced regional politics. Even when *ASEAN* auto-declared its anti-communist foundational prescriptions, *Southeast Asian regionalism* maintained its validity even if could not profit from extra-regional financial help, like *European Regionalism* did. *Southeast Asian Regionalism* had to rise on its own and permit the transition to a new security role for Southeast Asia. Even in the Cold War Era, *ASEAN*'s zeal mobilized its leverages to enrich the regional establishment and support new expansions. In the Cold War Era, *ASEAN* had to survive three Cold Wars: a systemic one – between US and USSR, and other two involving a regional power and a systemic force: the Cold War between US and China and the Cold War between USSR and China. The unpredictable security environment of Northeast Asia and the intimated hesitancy of its southern extremity lay little room for questioning. Although *ASEAN* delayed normative-building deeds, autonomy-generated regional dynamics had come eventually into being.

In *the post-Cold War Era*, the systemic level is no longer viewed as the chief catalyst of regional order and *ASEAN Regionalism* has developed strategic capabilities to resist extra-regional pressures. Discharging a central political role in the region, *ASEAN* is currently trying to force upon itself a transition to a security community. The *great power retrenchment* (apud E.R. Kelly:2007, pag.197-229) from the regions is energizing community building measures. *ASEAN* has to be prepared to reassess its norms and provide stronger reassurances measures for erasing inter-state tensions.

Southeast Asian Regionalism is an innovation for security theories. *ASEAN* is a building block for a distinctive form of *regionalism* – stronger than most forms of *regionalism* in the developing world[11] and weaker than those of the Western world – especially the one accounted for by the European Union[12]. *ASEAN* proves the fact that traces of *regionalism*, different from the European approach can also be found. *ASEAN regionalism* has a justifiable existence of its own. The coverage of its distinctive and self-reliant nature can be summarized with the following specifications:

- *The state-centrism of regional security dealings*: in *ASEAN Regionalism*, states have the primary and the most active involvement in regional security issues; *ASEAN Regionalism* is respectful of a relatively recent acquired independence of the regional states and seeks not to erode it;
- *An inductive trajectory of regional order*: *ASEAN* was created as a means to protect national identities and not to overlook their insights;
- The national level does not partially dissolve into *ASEAN Regionalism*, like in the *EU regionalism*; Nationhood engenders decision-making; The

[11] For instance, it created a more binding security pattern than the ones that can be investigated in South America or in Africa;

[12] In terms of promoting a process of integration;

final decision is the by-product of the national and regional interests' intersections;

- The three *"c"*s of the regional security management: *consultations*, *consensualism* and *cooperation*;
- *ASEAN* stands for *a heterogeneous region* – disparate historical backgrounds, different interactions with extra-regional actors, different linguistic families, different religious intromissions; The *striking heterogeneity* seems troubling for the purposes of creating a major regional project like *ASEAN*; *ASEAN*'s unity lies in the sober and negative antecedents that were endured by all of the regional states[13]; Concerted action was required to enable the regional states to confront extra-regional interference;
- *ASEAN*'s collective energy lies in the support it gathered for the informal style of its functionality, denoting an enormous amount of trust between its member states – the lack of more law-abiding norms means that the regional states do not feel threatened by each other and that material threats are likely to emerge from extra-regional surroundings; *ASEAN*'s collective capacity for generating consensus rests on the style and manner non-regulated initiatives are triggered and negotiated; A greater sense of morality can also be discerned: *ASEAN Regionalism* does not limit an ethical behavior, but rather it considers it immanent in regional interactions: the false panaceas of normative embellishments can breed resentment amongst states and reasons for distrust[14];
- *ASEAN*'s normative export into regional states is very modest compared to the European Union; *ASEAN* is currently under a trial phase: the Thai-Cambodian conflict will not drain out of its own initiative and *ASEAN* has to exercise a strong stirring of the situation so as to treat the deleterious effect that the conflict had upon its *Regionalism*;
- *European Regionalism* was molded to put an end to the passing on of balance of power policies from a security arrangement to another; *Southeast Asian Regionalism* was molded to provide an alternative of the balance of power policies of extra-regional actors;
- European over-utilized formalism is harshly criticized; Southeast Asian innate informal manner is also very harshly criticized – this common point between the two types of *regionalism* brings into relief their most important dissimilarities: Southeast Asian socio-cultural norms of *Musyawarah – Consultation* and *Mufakat – Consensus* stridently proclaim

[13] Except for Thailand – a regional state that was never colonized;

[14] If a conflict of interests could appear, then the introduction of a particular norm may be used to benefit one or more states and to disadvantage others;

a common regional tradition in Southeast Asia from the pre-colonial era, co-shared by all regional states; Regional interactions before the arrival of the colonial powers, under the pattern of commercial relations, evidences the fact Southeast Asian*regionalism* had a less unconventional view, down sided by extra-regional elements;

- *The security doctrine of non-interventionism*[15] of *Southeast Asian Regionalism* is at variance with the *carrots and sticks mechanism* of the European *regionalism*; *The carrots and sticks mechanism* of the *European Regionalism* is used with prevalence in different sectors of European action and is not a norm in-sourced in security affairs; Even so, this norm is particularly important because it enables the *European Regionalism* to apply sanctions; *Southeast Asian Regionalism* cannot apply sanctions as this situation would be interpreted as a disrespectful deed towards others' sovereignty;
- *Southeast Asian Regionalism* is confronted with lengthening shadow of nationalism; *European Regionalism* has the supranational strategic reach, especially in areas where common action is embraced; *Southeast Asian Regionalism* is nationally inspired and managed within an inter-governmental forum;
- As its global diplomatic reach is expanding, *Southeast Asian Regionalism* needs to mend the flaws of regional interdependence by gradually annihilating the distorting factors of regional cooperation – *ASEAN* has to reinvent norms or to re-evaluate their applicability;
- The interpenetrating regional influences in *Southeast Asian Regionalism* attest to the fact that *ASEAN* needs to produce incremental improvements so that it can be associated with the whole Southeast Asian region and not withstand baggage of historical experiences[16];
- The *ASEAN Way* is an extra-dimension of *ASEAN Regionalism*; It provides a lead into common security considerations, understated by regional norms, attitudes and behaviors;

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[15] This doctrine not only does not give way to constant leverage and maximum flexibility - hopes and aspirations that through *ASEAN* have come close to fruition, but also loses its utility in approaching the nearly – wrecked geopolitical realities of this region. The territorial disputes in this region – the Paracels Islands (claimed by Vietnam and China) and the Spratly Islands (claimed by China, the Philippines and Vietnam), the Mischief Reef (which was occupied in 1995 by China) – are sensitive issues of maritime security in the relationship with China, whose exploration is something of a minefield under the provisions of *the non-interference norm*. The non-interference norm virtually paralyzes *ASEAN*'s freedom of action in these disputes;

[16] With reference to East Timor's admission;

- If *ASEAN* is successful in quelling internal dissent by normative reinvention or normative production, then the qualitative improvement of *ASEAN Regionalism* will elevate its sense of morality;
- *ASEAN*'s norm-adherence is partially weak and partially weakly encouraged; This feature of *ASEAN Regionalism* can work both ways – it can represent an impulse for cooperation or an impulse for conflict; Even if the thrust of *ASEAN Regionalism* is to keep the security arrangements' formalism in a low key, the mutations that have taken place both regionally and inter-regionally does not recommend such a stagnant maintenance of the norm-reality hiatus;

In a final evaluation, *Southeast Asian New Security Regionalism* confirms both the blipping nature of regional security arrangements and the opportunities they present for the future of the regions experienced their rise. Institutional adroitness is missing in *ASEAN*. Future developments cannot outlast the institutional wreckages that are repeatedly encountered due to the aimless use of the *non-interventionist doctrine*. *ASEAN* has the responsibility to reinvent!

4. Concluding Remarks

ASEAN Regionalism was not modeled in the culture of competitiveness. Acting like a resistive force to change can make the prospect of the preservation of the regional autonomy instinctively outrun by the soft covers of accommodating extra-regional actors. It has survived many *nuclear winters*[17] when decision-making was at its hardest! It utilized normative dwelling as the formation of compounds of obvious significance, with no resort to imperative norms of behavior that would undermine national leverage. An institutional screening of *ASEAN*'s functioning would seem proper to recommend to *ASEAN* decision-makers that a more pragmatist regional approach be taken to fully fledge internal bickering and misunderstandings. *ASEAN* has to be prepared to use its norms wisely – for instance: for deterrence purposes. *ASEAN*'s lack of normative compliance needs to remain opaque in the process of inter-regional or global diplomatic bargaining. If not, at least *ASEAN* should refrain from using its convergent views as default mechanisms. If in the Cold War Era *ASEAN*'s main reasons for concern were extra-regional in nature, in the post-Cold War Era, *ASEAN* cast a long shadow over its credibility. *ASEAN* and its *regionalism* turned out to be seminal in accommodating extra-regional actors, but not systemic theories!

[17] Metaphor utilized by the author in order to show the drudgery exertions that have enacted some clever ideas of surpassing, even if they were not the most clever or the most long-standing for its regional tenure.

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INDONESIA NOW. BETWEEN PANCASILA AND CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

Normally in politics will be colored by political activities such as lobbying, transactional politics, money politics, and the most risky trend is likely more rampant corruption because the party trying to increase purse from a variety of sources. The political year 2013 called for Indonesia to meet the 2014 election in which all political parties who passed the verification will prepare themselves for the competition and contestation for legislative elections that will be held April 2014.

The year 2013 was marked by increasing political climate warming caused by not building trust or mutual trust among the parties. Moreover, the pattern of relations between civil society and political parties are also less communicative. Political flare-up in 2013 was also driven by competition parties in preparing to compete in a presidential candidate. Unlike the presidential election 2009, election 2014 not only brings parties and vice presidential candidates, civil society leaders will also deliver an alternative candidate for the party. Civil society demands increasingly shrill make political climate gets hotter. The battle between political parties in convincing the public is not about easy. Meanwhile, fears of losing the election not rule parties would justify all the all the way to win.

As an open ideology, Pancasila should provide orientation to the future which requires the Indonesian people to always be aware of the lives that are being and will face, especially the era of globalization and democracy. Pancasila ideology calls for the Indonesian people still survive in the soul and culture of Indonesia and within the bounds of the State unitary Republic of Indonesia.

And now, the values of Pancasila must constantly be revitalized, to prevent them from becoming obsolete, and at all times be relevant and able to solve issues concerning the nation and State, toward the attainment of a better future, which is a common future. This common future is the future of all ethnic groups, of all ethnic classes and religions, the future of all of us that have determined to be united in an Archipelagic State which is multiethnic, multiracial, and although possessing a large number of disintegrating factors, are strongly bonded in unity, with, by and because of Pancasila. Indonesia's own version of a secular-oriented ideology is "Pancasila" (designed by the nation's first president, Soekarno) since independence, Pancasila has been a sore point for the diversity, who seek at the very least some form of constitutional requirement for the state to enforce democracy.

Keywords: Pancasila, Transactional Politics, Crisis of Democracy

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Background Issues

Since the founding of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, the Indonesian nation agreed to adopt the *Pancasila* (the Five Principles) as the Indonesian State Philosophy, formulated in paragraph 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which stipulates "therefore, the national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the sovereign Republic of Indonesia which is based on the belief in the One and Only God, justice and humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives and the realization of social justice for all of the people of Indonesia".

Pancasila, as we know today, is the essence of Ir. Soekarno's speech during a session of the Agency for Investigating Efforts for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence on June 6th 1945, it responds to the primary challenge of the Agency's session, namely "what shall we adopt as our state philosophy?" And according to *Bung Karno* - meaning Elder Brother Karno as Ir. Soekarno was popularly referred to by the people - he discovered those five principles when delving in the wealth of Indonesia's own history, culture, and tradition, principles that existed among the Indonesian people since the early days. As indeed, the noble values rediscovered by Bung Karno have been in existence for a long time within our society.

For example "*gotong royong*" - a concept where people share a common burden and work together in mutual cooperation toward a common goal - and tolerance have always been a culture in the Maluku community before 6th June 1945, among others known as a tradition of "*pela-gandong"* where both the Moslem and the Christian communities have been standing side-by-side to help each other. Indeed, during the formulation and subsequent ratification of the State Constitution on 18th August 1945, there were people who proposed Islam to become the Indonesian State philosophy by adding seven Indonesian words to the First Principle to become "…belief in the One and Only God with the compulsory observance of the Islam Syariah Law by its followers".

But as we know, this proposal was rejected by a number of leaders from Eastern Indonesia who proclaimed that if those seven words were inserted, "it would be better for our brothers and sisters in Eastern Indonesia to be outside of the Republic of Indonesia." This message was conveyed to *Bung Hatta* (Dr. Drs. H. Mohammad Hatta who became the first Indonesian Vice President) by the Japanese Admiral Maeda, to be passed on to the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence. Bung Hatta subsequently passed on the objection to the members of the Committee, in particular to the Moslem leaders who eventually agreed to delete those seven words (according to several people, the negotiation to delete those seven words only took about 10 minutes).

Why was the negotiation so short and why did the Moslem leaders, at that time with full awareness, agree to the deletion of those seven words? The reason

was that they were all aware that if those seven words were maintained and not deleted, the situation would lead to the disintegration of the state and the nation which was only one day old, meaning that the territory of the Republic of Indonesia would not include the regions of Eastern Indonesia. This consensus was reached because those who were in the Committee and conducted the negotiations were leaders of the nation, not merely politicians, but more than that, they were great statesmen, the founding fathers of the Republic of Indonesia who guided by inner wisdom and understanding, planned and founded the Republic of Indonesia. This also demonstrated the tolerant attitude and recognition by the founders of the republic toward minority groups in Indonesia, and at the same time showed an acknowledgement and awareness of the plurality of the Indonesian nation which only recently proclaimed its independence.

The awareness, acknowledgement, and respect for the nation's plurality contained in and guaranteed by Pancasila, were believed to be capable of uniting the Indonesian nation from one era to another, until today. Eventually, this also gave birth to the nation's motto, namely "Bhineka Tunggal Ika" meaning "Unity in Diversity". However, during the course of time and Indonesian history, the interaction with other nations, and the dynamics of the nation's political life, Pancasila went through ups and downs through differences in interpretation, meaning, and actualization in line with the era of the rulers of the Republic of Indonesia.

When Suharto fell there was a widespread expectation that Indonesia would embark on a swift process of change towards liberal democracy. And yet, the expansion of electoral politics since then does not seem to have led to substantial democratic reforms, much less the establishment of a liberal democracy. Political contestation in Indonesia remains confined to a competing coalition of predatory interests, to the exclusion of civil society forces. Also, with the exercise of predatory power through money politics and political thuggery still constituting a major part of political contestation, the fundamental underpinning of Indonesian politics seems to have changed very little. The primary motivation behind this article is to account for why such a form of political transition has occurred in Indonesia.

Though the literature on Indonesia is varied and diverse, it is probably no exaggeration to say that the major tendency is to emphasise the transitory nature of Indonesian politics, which is seen to be still on its way to liberal democracy. Such a view is informed by a particular theory of democratic transition, which claims to be universal, but which has arisen out of the particular experience of the West (i.e. liberal theory). Driven by a belief in its universal potential, this theory claims that economic development facilitates the emergence of social forces that drive a democratic transition. The end point of such a transition is "Western-style liberal democracy."

By embracing the past, present, and future, Pancasila becomes the basis for all legitimate political activity. After more than a decade since the fall of Suharto,

Indonesian politics has been persistently illiberal in nature. Though elections grew increasingly free and fair after 1998, the expansion of electoral politics has not transformed the clientelist nature of Indonesian politics. Thus despite the expectation that post-Suharto Indonesia would embark on a swift process of change towards a liberal mode of governance, the empowerment of civil society forces has not occurred. The primary motivation of the article was to account for why an illiberal form of politics still persists even after "democratic transition," which in theory should have been accompanied by the gradual removal of authoritarian elements.

To do this, the article first pointed to the irrelevance of liberal theory in the context of Indonesia and suggested that a redirection of research strategy is needed. From the outset the article emphasised the importance of breaking free from the historical determinism implicit within a liberal interpretation of political change in Indonesia and bringing the insights of area specialists, who question its relevance to East and Southeast Asia, to the wider theoretical debate on democratic transition. In particular, the article took issue with the clear separation of state and society implicit in liberal theory. Instead of searching for civil society forces pressuring the state, the article suggested that one should look for what is occurring within the state.

Political Conditions in Indonesia Now

At the present time, freedom of the press has been achieved in Indonesia, something considered to be missing in the life of the state in the past. Today, the press in Indonesia is able to grow and develop without having to face the threat of being closed down or repressive measures of the ruler. Agencies having the responsibilities for licensing, censorship and closing down of the press no longer exist in Indonesia. The press is free to write anything. Coverage that harms a person or an institution is no longer dealt with using political violence, but rather, it must be accounted for and resolved based on the law in a transparent manner.

Currently, the Indonesian people can freely join and form political parties in accordance with the criteria they themselves agree upon. The Indonesian people are now free to establish political parties without being driven to follow a particular political party, as long as they meet the requirements based on the support of the people themselves.

Why has then such political situation or environment developed?[2]

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[2] Research data is the United Nations Development Program, the National Development Planning Agency, Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior launched the Indonesian Democracy Index 2010. Overall, the Indonesian democracy index in 2010 decreased from 2009, from 67.30 down to 63.17 value. It means that there is a national index decline by 4:13 points. The variables are grouped into three aspects, namely civil liberties is still relatively good, political rights that are in poor category, and democratic institutions are classified as being of the 33 provinces. For the civil liberties aspects, it dropped from 86.97 in

In the opinion, this has happened due to the tendency of our developing democracy to become somehow liberal without being followed by strong law enforcement. The people's sovereignty has been developing in discordance with the rule of law.

We cannot close our eyes and ears to the fact that there are many people protesting against the reform today. According to them, the New Order regime was right and we been wrong in implementing reform because in reality, the Indonesian nation is increasingly being thrown into disorder. Some even say that we have made a mistake by choosing democracy. Democracy, which is supposed to be from, by and for the people, is in reality only from the people, by the elite and for the political ruler at the present time.

Fourteen years ago, we called out for reform with a collective awareness that a change had to be made and that such change had to be interpreted as democratization in the political life. Subsequently, democracy experienced a leap of tremendous progress that has been often referred to as liberalisation, however, the general condition did not actually improve following the reform. Many people then became upset with the democracy being implemented currently. The results of a study by Saiful Mujani *et al.* in the book, "*Kuasa Rakyat, Analisis tentang Perilaku Pemilih dalam Pemilihan Legislatif dan Presiden Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* (People's Power, an Analysis of the Voters' Behavior in the Legislative and Presidential Elections in Post-New Order Indonesia)" (Mizan, 2012: 443) state that the level of people's participation in the post-New Order general elections decreased quite dramatically from approximately 85% (1999) to approximately 70% (2009). According to the authors, this also illustrates that there has been deterioration in the quality of democracy.

Why is this happening? Have we lost our way in implementing the reform?

After the 1999 General Elections, for the sake of democratization, the 1945 Constitution was amended for the purpose of closing the doors to authoritarianism as well as corruption, collusion and nepotism. Today, we have the 1945 Constitution with, we may say, a far more democratic substance. Following the amendments to the 1945 Constitution, democracy has been manifested in almost all sectors of life in a lively and intense manner.

However, our democracy is still facing many problems. Civil society continues to grow, however, it is not accompanied by the growth of the social order. Freedom as a

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2009 to 82.53 to 2010. The measured value of the variable civil liberties, freedom of belief, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom from discrimination.

Aspects of the political right down to 54.60 in 2009 to 47.87 in 2010. The measured value of the variable political rights, the right to elect and be elected, and the right to political participation and decision-making and oversight. To aspects of democratic institutions increased slightly from 62.72 in 2009 to 63.11. Indonesian Democracy Index saw a slight improvement continues to display free and fair elections, the role of Parliament, the role of political parties, the role of the government bureaucracy, and an independent judiciary.

typical symbol of democracy has instead resulted in anarchic and hedonistic behaviors which are contradictory to democracy. Although civil liberties are guaranteed in the constitution, they have not been able to enhance the quality of tolerance which is non-discriminatory against the minorities. Political freedom has been provided space and guarantees, however, it has not been balanced by civil liberties of quality, hence some people say that democracy in Indonesia "has gone too far". In many parts of this country, numerous cases of oppression, discrimination, and marginalization are still occurring.

In the political arena, power relations have been contaminated by the factors of nepotism and transactional politics. In the government sector, many officials have been indicated, and some of them have even been proven to have acted corruptly, leading to a point where a certain mass media printed it in large letters that our country is a Republic of Corruptors. In the legal sector, law enforcement has not been optimal, with widespread non-compliance with the law, anarchy and mobocracy are still occurring frequently. The law has become blunt for the strongly suspected reason that it is still controlled by the law mafia. At the same time, democracy without law is bound to cause chaos and destroy democracy itself because the state of "democracy being destroyed democratically" can potentially occur. That is why I so often cry out stating that "democracy must be built in line with the development of law".[3]

We can say that the sovereignty or power of the people in a democracy has been bought up by a lot of corrupt elites. In reality, democracy is giving room only to the people in power on the momentum of general elections, namely at the time when people are in the voting booths at the polling stations. If we calculate it, the people are enjoying power in democracy for only 5 minutes, while the elite enjoy it for five years or for 41,839 hours and 55 minutes (2,570,395 minutes). These five minutes are counted when a citizen is casting a vote as a voter in the voting booth during the general election. The remaining 41,839 hours and 55 minutes (2570395) are the time for the ruling elites who enjoy partying with the portion of power without any concern for the people who have elected them from the completion of an election until the time for the next election comes.

[3] All we can say right now is that our democracy is in crisis because the people are only 'used' by the elite to enjoy the power obtained from a transactional democracy. This is what Bung Karno called democracy without *demos*, namely democracy similar to that in post-revolutionary France. Bung Karno made the following statement regarding this matter:
"*Let us remember how sometimes the false slogan of democracy does not help the common people; on the contrary, it sacrifices the common people just like what happened in the French Revolution*."

The Development of Indonesia Democracy

Period	Democratic System	Explanation
1945 – 1949	Pancasila Democracy	Implementation of democracy in the reign of a new revolution in parliament is limited to political interaction and the functioning of the press in favor of the revolution. Although not many historical records relating to the development of democracy in this period, but that period has been placed on fundamental matters. First, granting political rights as a whole. Second, the constitutional president is likely to be a dictator. Third, by edict Vice President, then it is possible the formation of a political party that later became the foundation stone for the party system in Indonesia for a later period in the history of our political life.
1949 – 1950	Parliamentary Democracy	In this period the Constitution applies RIS. Indonesia is divided into several states. Adopted the system of government is parliamentary democracy (Liberal Democratic System). Government run by the Prime Minister and the President only as a symbol. Because people generally reject RIS, so on August 17, 1950 President Sukarno declared back into the Unitary State with Provisional Constitution of 1950.
1950 – 1959	Parliamentary Democracy	Cabinet has always alternated, consequently the development does not go smoothly, each party pay more attention to the interests of the party or state faction. After 1950 and Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia to the Liberal Democratic system experienced Indonesian people for nearly 9 years, the Indonesian people are aware that the Provisional Constitution of 1950 with a system Liberal democracy is not suitable, because it does not fit with the spirit of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Finally the President considers that the Indonesian condition endanger national unity actand impedes the development of the universe and plan to fair and prosperous; thus on July 5, 1959 announced the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the decrees of the re-enactment of the 1945 enactment of the Provisional Constitution 1950.
1959 – 1965	Guided Democracy	In this period often called the Old Order. Constitution used is 1945 with guided democracy system. According to the 1945 Constitution, the president is not accountable to Parliament, the president and DPR under MPR. Definition of guided democracy on fourth principle of Pancasila is led by representatives of wisdom in the deliberations, but the president will interpret "guided", ie the leadership is hands' Leader of the Revolution. "Thus the concentration of power in the hands of the president. concentration of forces the cause irregularities in the hands of the president and fraud against Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution which culminates in seizure power from PKI on September 30, 1965 (G30S/PKI) which is national disaster for Indonesia.

Period	Democratic System	Explanation
1966 – 1998	Pancasila Democracy	This period is known as the New Order government, which was determined to implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is genuine and consistent. Strictly implemented system Pancasila Democracy and restored function and high state supreme institution in accordance with the mandate of the 1945 Constitution. In its implementation as a result of the power and the president's term is not restricted period, then piled on the president's power, so that there was abuse of power, with the flourishing culture of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). Restricted freedom of speech, democratic practices become apparent. The department serves as a tool of government power. Thus was born the reform movement spearheaded by students demanding reforms in various fields. The climax is the statement of resignation of Suharto as president.
1998 - Now	Democracy based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution	Democracy developed in the future reforms is essentially based on Pancasila democracy and the 1945 Constitution, with refinement and improvement implementation regulations are not democratic, with the increasing role of higher institutions and the State supreme with confirmed functions, powers and responsibilities of the referring on the principle of separation of powers and procedures of a clear relationship between executive agencies, legislative and judicial branches. Indonesian democracy has now begun with the establishment of the House of Representatives - Assembly Election results 1999 has a president and vice president as well as the creation of institutions to another high..

As I have stated above, we must distinguish democracies into two different domains, namely the conceptual domain and the implementation domain. It is obvious that conceptually, the 1945 Constitution provides guidelines on the type of democracy that we aspire to and the type of democracy that we want to build. There is no problem at the conceptual level, as everything is crystal clear. The democracy that we want to build is not just any democracy, but rather, a people-oriented democracy with the ultimate goal of "public welfare". In my view, our current crisis of democracy is at the implementation level, therefore, the problem is on how the system is being implemented and no longer on how the system is designed. When it comes to implementation, of course, the problem lies in the moral integrity of the organizers, because no matter how good the concept is, without moral integrity of those responsible, such concepts would be useless.

One of the things that can be done is to make the people become smart voters. The people should be made smart in selecting the elite who will take the top position in power, in order for them not to get trapped into choosing what or who Aristotle called a demagogue. Political recruitment which includes nepotism and which is transactional in nature has so far been proven to produce dirty politicians with negative behavior, who are detrimental to the Indonesian people.

It is also imperative to improve the system and implementation of general elections, including the structuring of the party system. General elections that we

have carried out, although implemented without any interruptions and considered procedurally democratic, have not demonstrated any substantial democratic character.

Of no less importance are the issues of leadership and example. In order to realize a healthy democracy, strong, courageous, incorruptible as well as clean leadership is needed, rather than authoritarian and arbitrary leaders. It should be emphasized that firm leadership does not mean cruel and arbitrary leadership. Firm leadership is effective and decisive leadership exercising authority in accordance with the aspirations and needs of the people.

Thus, one of the fundamental problems in Indonesia is how to seriously rearrange bureaucracy in order for it to become clean and professional. Following that, law enforcement institutions must be prioritized because these institutions -such as the police, prosecutor's office, the Corruption Eradication Commission, and the courts- are the spearheads in our movement towards becoming free from the practices and culture of corruption. Law enforcement institutions are often described as the "broom" which will be used to clean the house of our nation from the dirt of corruption. What happens when we "sweep" the house with a dirty "broom" is that the dirt will stick all over the floor and walls of the house of our nation.

The main reason behind the limited success of endeavors for bureaucratic reform is that the system, procedures and mechanisms as well as the officials who have the automatic tendency to work in a corrupt manner have been developed for decades. This is coupled with the political leadership which is still left with plenty of old players who have remained unchanged and who have the interest to protect the corrupt practices involving them. On the other hand, new leaders are emerging without a vision, rather, they only wish to enjoy the opportunities and chance for corruption which they never had before. Many political and bureaucratic officials view the reform as an opportunity to get their turn to loot the state's wealth. They view the reform as their turn for corruption.

A bureaucracy well-established with corruption tends to be resistant to bureaucratic reform efforts. There is a tendency not to implement the adopted policies seriously and consistently, especially when not supported by the leaders' policies. This is because the old bureaucratic system brought benefits and comfort, while the bureaucratic reform to be implemented is seen as not necessarily offering the same benefits and comfort, and even posing a threat on the existing benefits and comfort. This is not to mention the fear of corrupt practices committed in the past being exposed.

However, many such efforts towards synergy have not demonstrated any results because each institution and their respective apparatuses lack a common commitment to implement the same. In addition to the issues of organizational communication and the ability to move the organization, the problem has also been caused by the

persisting atmosphere of unfair competition and the corps spirit that tends to be negative, all of which further deteriorate the mutual blockade situation. This point brings us to the issue of leadership at various levels, which has in fact failed in driving its institutions and apparatuses.

Based on the foregoing, I can conclude that a variety of problems in Indonesia have not been caused by any conceptual-paradigmatic fault or the normative regulation thereof, but rather, they have been caused by the deviation of democracy from its underlying system. Such deviation is marked by transactional and mutual hostage-taking politics as a result of which the law cannot be enforced.

In my view, the major problems in Indonesia can only be resolved through law enforcement in the sense of making the law as the commander. The efforts to make the law as the commander must begin with the structuring of political recruitment in order to make it free of transactional and mutual hostage-taking politics. This is where the awareness of political parties as the forum for political leadership recruitment is required in order to conduct recruitment with full responsibility and by upholding moral integrity.

Discourses of the Pancasila State

Despite many Indonesians' distrust in the New Order's bills or policies relating to the concepts of the Pancasila State, and that these policies failed to be implemented properly, it still seemed certain that the objectives were related to the goals of suppressing primordial politics, economic injustice, and the Islamic privileges, all of which were represented in the ideals of Pancasila discussed in 1945. Yet, as seen earlier, this "imagined community," wherein different societal groups were expected to subject their interests to those of the nation for the sake of harmony and order, was inherently vulnerable. While rejecting the concept of a majority based upon ethnic or religious ties, the concepts of the Pancasila State inevitably encapsulated the "beneficiaries"/ "victims" relations along these lines in Indonesian society.

In general, the major beneficiaries included certain strata in society. Non-Muslims or nominal Muslims could contain the demands of orthodox Muslims for further Islamization of society. Thus, orthodox Muslims opposed the concepts of the Pancasila State because the concepts clearly segregated religion from the public domain. Politically, the president and the army were assured of their position within the social order, while the masses and political parties were suppressed as potentially disruptive to the social fabric. Nevertheless, many Indonesians opposed the containment of mass participation in politics and the government's domination of this sphere. Economically, the indigenous people and their economic agencies, including cooperatives and the government sector, maintained an advantage over foreigners, including Chinese Indonesians and private companies.

The latter had to deal with various economic sanctions from the state trying to implement a Pancasila Economy and its vision of a moral economy founded on social justice. The history of the Pancasila State throughout these eras was characterized by the continuous contention of "victimized" groups with the "unfair" imposition of the concepts of Pancasila by the state. The opposition of the victim groups to the concepts of Pancasila created confusion, difficulty, and frustration for the government as it sought to balance diverse social and political interests. This difficulty in adjusting the various interests allowed the state to legitimize its strong authority with the agenda of balancing such interests.

Unlike general scholarly opinion on this subject, I believe that the failure of Pancasila during the New Order period was not entirely caused by the government utilizing the concepts of the Pancasila State, particularly Pancasila Democracy, for its political purposes. It is true that the New Order's authoritarianism and the rampant corruption undermined its legitimacy and standing in the eyes of the people. However, a more fundamental problem was the inability to balance rival interests that were at times irreconcilable. In other words, the failure resulted from the fact that the government was neither strong nor skillful, and did not possess the legitimacy to implement its policies or bills formulated on the ideals of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The societal groups during these times were not entirely victimized entities, as portrayed by Western observers. The state could not successfully check and control the various interests of such societal groups, which were concerned about potential political, economic, and social implications of consensus with the Pancasila State.

The key change in the discussions was found in the placement of the Pancasila State within the context of a civil society. The presenters of the symposium pointed out that past Indonesian national leaders' promotion of the family state(as a concept of a strong state) as the right basis for the Pancasila State was a cunning political tactic to justify the much larger role of the state vis-à-vis society (Azra 2006: 146). While citing the civil society as the basic ground for the Pancasila State, the presenters declared that the first critical problem facing the post-Suharto era, for which Pancasila could provide solutions, would be ethnic and religious polarization.

How is Indonesia's Democracy Doing?

After more than a decade since the fall of Suharto, Indonesian politics has been persistently illiberal in nature. Though elections grew increasingly free and fair after 1998, the expansion of electoral politics has not transformed the clientelist nature of Indonesian politics. Thus despite the expectation that post-Suharto Indonesia would embark on a swift process of change towards a liberal mode of governance, the empowerment of civil society forces has not occurred. The primary motivation of the article was to account for why an illiberal form of politics still persists even

after "democratic transition," which in theory should have been accompanied by the gradual removal of authoritarian elements. To do this, the article first pointed to the irrelevance of liberal theory in the context of Indonesia and suggested that a redirection of research strategy is needed (Mahfud, Moch, 2012).[4]

From the outset the article emphasised the importance of breaking free from the historical determinism implicit within a liberal interpretation of political change in Indonesia and bringing the insights of area specialists, who question its relevance to East and Southeast Asia, to the wider theoretical debate on democratic transition. In particular, the article took issue with the clear separation of state and society implicit in liberal theory. Instead of searching for civil society forces pressuring the state, the article suggested that one should look for what is occurring within the state.

While keeping his insight that democratization offers a mechanism through which to manage elite cleavages, the clientelist model placed greater emphasis on politics, rather than on economic policy, as the key factor leading to the emergence of elite cleavages. From this perspective, political transition offers a mechanism through which to manage intra-elite conflict fought between different centres of predatory power over the distribution of patronage. Since the mid 1990s, the proportion of countries in the world that are democracies – countries that meet the standard of at least electoral democracies in the sense that they can choose their leaders and replace them in free and fair elections – has stagnated, at around 60 and 62.5 per cent. The world is experiencing a democratic recession. There are three dimensions of this.

Firstly, there is levelling off of in the extent of democracy. Secondly, there has been a rise in incidence of democratic breakdown in the world. Of the 29 democratic breakdowns since the third wave of democratization began in 1974, 17 (59 per cent) have occurred since 1999. Thirdly many of these democratic breakdowns have happened in places that can be considered big, strategically important states, powers in their regions, and peers of Indonesia.

Indonesia is now labelled by Freedom House as a 'free country' – although this is a somewhat misleadingly broad category. Nevertheless, Indonesia is doing better today than any of the democracies that lost democracy were at the time they lost it. A worrisome trend is the recent erosion not only of democracy but of levels of freedom. The last three years – 2006, 2007, 2008 – are the first three successive years

[4] "Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, the Republic of Indonesia. In fact, political transition in Indonesia was caused by a serious disruption of the stable circulation of patronage. This produced a significant gap between the expectations of an increasing number of political elites and the performance of Suharto's patrimonial state. In this context, political reform proceeded in ways that former "outsiders" regained access to patronage which was previously dominated by an exclusive circle of "insiders." This model explains not only the continuity from the Suharto era, which liberal theory is ill-placed to account for, but also some subtle and yet no less significant changes, which are often overlooked by some area specialists who tend to emphasise continuity from the authoritarian past."

since the end of the Cold War when the number of countries declining in a given year in their levels of freedom exceeded the number of countries improving their levels of freedom.

The fact that Indonesia is holding its own at a *relatively* good level of political rights and civil liberties is itself a noteworthy achievement. While Indonesia's civil liberties, political rights, and levels of governance have improved since 2005, it still has levels of governance, by a number of measures, which are in some respects in the category of vulnerability. The trend recently has been to suggest that Indonesia has either consolidated democracy or is very far along the path of doing so. There are grounds for being a little more sceptical.

Nevertheless, the level of public support for democracy in Indonesia compares favourably compared to other regions of the world. Globally there is a growing ambivalence toward democracy. In East Asia and Africa only about half of respondents, in various surveys, on average rejected all of the 3 authoritarian options put to them: the military coming back to power; one party rule; and getting rid of parliament and having a strong ruler decide everything. The cause of this is basically the reputation a government has in respect of bad governance.

So, how do Indonesia's levels of governance and democracy fare in these comparisons?[5]

A common story is that Indonesia began, at its moment of democratic transition in 1998, with pretty bad governance on most measures. One measure of governance is economic performance. Indonesia's average rate of GDP growth during the past decade has been respectable compared to a set of other significant emerging market democracies regionally and globally.

The rule of law in Indonesia has barely improved at all, and is still very weak. This is something we should worry about. And this is why we should exercise some

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[5] Indonesia's Human Development Index (HDI) score, perhaps the most meaningful measure of economic development – incorporating standards of living, health, and education – improved almost 10 per cent between 1995 and 2006, reaching 73 per cent. This rate of improvement is greater than many of its peers, such as the Philippines and Thailand, and Indonesia has now almost caught up with the Philippines in terms of its HDI score.

A number of measures of governance used by the World Bank are also useful. In 1998 Indonesia was in the bottom quintile in the world in terms of its level of voice and accountability. Only about 7 or 8 countries have improved their voice and accountability score as dramatically as Indonesia has. It now outranks several other countries, even Turkey surprisingly, and has overtaken the Philippines as well. But Indonesia is still out ranked by some more established democracies in East Asia. In control of corruption Indonesia's improvement in performance has been even more dramatic. But it started from an incredibly low level at the 9th percentile that it is still in the bottom third in the world. While Indonesia has now taken a higher position than the Philippines in terms of control of corruption too, it clearly needs to go further.

caution in advancing a judgement that democracy in Indonesia is now consolidated. Even with respect to some not very well performing countries in the region, in terms of rule of law Indonesia finishes dead last among the democracies or quasi democracies in Asia.

Indonesia has of course improved it Freedom House score dramatically more than any of the countries in the sample. But again, it started from such a low level that it still has ground to catch up despite the improvements. On the rule of law and political stability, things got worse between 1998 and 2003. Here you can really see the impact of the Yudhoyono presidency in terms of bringing about, or at least witnessing, significant improvements in the quality of governance.

Conclusion

Whatever the case may be, Pancasila as the state philosophy, the ideology and way of life of the people, and as a unifying instrument of the Indonesia nation, to which we have consented for the past 67 years, cannot be replaced by any other ideology; because by replacing it, the nation will crumble, due to the fact that there is an abundant number of discerning factors which may cause the disintegration of our nation. The United States of America is terra firma, we are an archipelago, and the only integrative factor is Pancasila, which unites us as a nation.

Hence, the remaining issue is how we can actualize and revitalize the noble values inherent in Pancasila into all aspects of our lives and the development of our nation. We must be of one say and action, beginning with the leaders of the nation. In the past two years, the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia, has recommenced to promote the four Pillars of Nationalism, namely Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and Bhineka Tunggal Eka (Unity in Diversity). This is to be implemented by the members of the Indonesian Parliament, who are also members of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia. The subject of Pancasila is again introduced into the elementary and high school curriculum. This is implemented because there are clear indications of the erosive trend regarding comprehension, and behaviour that no longer conform to Pancasila, may even cause the elimination of Pancasila from our lives.

Parliament must be stalwart in overseeing the Government, in order for the direction and policies of Development in any and all fields to be in accordance with the values of Pancasila. The direction and strategy of our development should be founded on the values of Pancasila, it must be able to alleviate poverty and ignorance, able to eradicate corruption and injustice, able to encourage development that is "pro-poor", "pro job" and "pro sustainable development". Development based on Pancasila is a continuation of reform, one that is able to carry out "nation and character building". National development that carries on the 1998 Reform, should in essence be the Implementation of Pancasila. So that Pancasila becomes a living

ideology that can be put into action. This effort must not fail, because failure may lead people to seek alternative ideologies, and that is what will disintegrate the nation.

The role of Community Organizations must continue and improve, as they are able toencourage brotherhood, unity, and unanimity in the spirit of tolerance. The values of Pancasila must constantly be revitalized, to prevent them from becoming obsolete, and at all times be relevant and able to solve issues concerning the nation and State, toward the attainment of a better future, which is a common future. This common future is the future of all ethnic groups, of all ethnic classes and religions, the future of all of us that have determined to be united in an Archipelagic State which is multiethnic, multiracial, and although possessing a large number of disintegrating factors, are strongly bonded in unity, with, by and because of Pancasila.

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QUALITY CULTURE IN ROMANIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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Abstract

The idea of quality applied in public administration can sometimes seem utopian. However, it is not utopian, given that citizens are taxpayers and as such are entitled to impeccable service.

Therefore, I consider it necessary to implement a real culture of quality in public administration, in order to ensure good quality services for citizens and achieve their interests, on one hand. On the other hand, the culture of quality is mandatory for serving the national public interest.

Keywords: quality management, quality culture, ethics, public

Organizational Culture in Public Sector

Organizational culture is a component strongly shaping the behavior of public employees. It is represented by a set of distinctive, spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features, outcoming of the way individuals are thinking, feeling, of their personality, revealed in work process, that originate significant public organizations mission and its objectives (Androniceanu, A. 2004).

On the other hand, organizational culture is defined as the set of values, beliefs, aspirations, expectations and behaviors, shaped up in each organization, over time, and prevailing therein while conditioning directly or indirectly its functionality and performance. (Nicolescu, O., Verboncu, I., 1999).

It is worth to keep in mind a very simple definition of organizational culture, given by Marvin Bower (Deal, T., Kennedy, AE, 1982) , ex-CEO of McKensey & Company: *"Culture is the way we do things around here."*

Culture provides members of the organization, whether it is public or private one, a sense of organizational identity and generates at the same time a commitment to shared beliefs and values, as Edgar Schein says in his "Organizational culture" (Schein, E., 1994).

This is why it is important that no confusion occur between organizational culture and organizational climate. The latter expresses the mood of the staff, which tends to prevail in a given period, representing both a reflection of organizational culture, as well as of the recent developments in the organization, particularly economic and managerial.

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Although the ideas that become part of the organizational culture can arise from anywhere within the organization, the organizational culture usually is started bu a founder or with one of the first leaders, that articulate and implement certain ideas and values into a vision, philosophy or strategy. When these ideas and values lead to performance, they become institutionalized and thus arises an organizational culture that reflects the vision and strategy of the leader or founder.

In public sector organizations there are some particularities, as many of the values and ideas underlying organizational culture are taken from different theoretical approaches and classic traditionalist models. These are influenced by the type of state, the forms of democracy promotion, by the strategies and general policy of the state (Nicolescu, O., Verboncu, I, 1999).

Starting from the bureaucratic approach of the sociologist Max Weber and adopted by many public organizations, we can say that each of them set up their own system of values and fundamental ideas of organizational culture, according to their field of work. Thus, we can also identify thinking patterns in the content of organizational culture, together with the ideas and values than emerging from theories, practical approaches and coordinates of the state policy in the public sector. There sre to be added feelings and manifestations of the Employees acquired over their personal life and within public organizations. We so notice two categories of factors that influence the content of organizational culture in the public sector:

- *theoretical factors* – they are variable, modifying through historical periods and providing an advanced flexibility to the organizational culture.
- *factors related to human nature* – these are inherited by the public organization through its employees, as representative vectors of national cultural values specific to the context in which they were born, were educated and now working. In Romanian public organizations a collective internal identity is developing, through the organizational culture, as core cultural values guides their daily activities and determine how people communicate with each other, what behaviors are acceptable and which are not, as well as the distribution of power and intrusion of the state in their private life. Therefore, we can observe informal forms of communication between the employees in the public organizations, together with a common understanding on the concepts they use in their activity. As a result, they spontaneously constitute teams, work groups according to specific interests, based also on compatibility between people, which facilitates collaboration on professional issues (Androniceanu, A., 2004).

We can also mention the way organizational culture influences civil servants. Their statute normally refers to the position and prestige that an employee has within the organization as they are perceived by its constituents. Statute states that a person is perceived as more powerful and influential than others and vice versa.

O. Nicolescu and I. Verboncu (1999) show that most experts consider that the status of an employee in an organization has a triple determination:

- *Functional* – reflecting the occupation and type of performed work;
- *Hierarchic* – linked to the position of the employee in the hierarchal structure, his competences and responsibilities;
- *Personal* – or informal – reflecting the knowledge, skills, abilities of the employee.

This triple determination is valid for the public administration in Romania, as there is a fairly strict legislation in this regard. It is to be noted that the hierarchical determination is prevailing, based on the fact that executive officials are required to execute the orders of their superiors. There is an exception to this rule, when the superior order is illegal.

The outcome of the research we performed, on several public authorities and institutions in Bucharest and in the country, pointed that personal and informal factor put its print on organizational culture of these institutions. Thus, if the hierarchic factor is often compelled and there are cases in which the manager has not a long history on his position, the personal determination is lengthy by contrast, while referring to some career civil servants, who "made history" in the workplace. They represent some true legends, their advice is required in many situations, they are presented as myths institution's to juniors, sometimes viewed as true emblems.

It is not unusual that a career oriented public servant to be granted with the halo of a legend, as full respect for civil servants law leads to an official perfect image of the civil servant, always ready to serve the citizens, but respecting the public interest all the same.

Quality Culture in Public Institutions

Quality culture is the totality of acquired or recognized knowledge, of the quality values, on which the organization develop its own capacity to survive within the external environment and manage their own internal affairs. It contains a system of values, traditions, procedures and expectations resulting in an organizational environment oriented towards the maintenance and continuous improvement (Stanciu, I., 2003).

Quality culture is a culture of performance. JJSherwood (1998) believes that the organizational culture based on performance, the following practices are widely promoted:

- Delegation of tasks, competences and responsibilities;
- Team working through a strong leadership;
- Correlate and integrate human resources with technology; employees are the ones responsible for how the technical potential is valued, in order to make better use of the human potential and enhance performance;
- Moving towards a common goal (Androniceanu, A., 2004).

Don Hellriegel, John Slocum Jr. and Richard W.Woodman (1998) identified a different type of culture which finds application especially in public institutions

providing public services. It is about the absolute or total quality culture which emphasize on citizens as customers, continuous improvement and teamwork. Employees of such organizations believe that the key to the organization future is serving the beneficiaries (Androniceanu, A, 2004).

For getting a good performance, an organization in the public sector must have a strong culture, first of all. Public organizations with strong cultures, and performing on the idea of a total quality, are clearly and constantly stating their values. We recognize that they aim at something, and the managers put a strong emphasis on communication and strengthen these values at all levels of the institution. Also, the values must be communicated to the institution officials through daily activities and the whole behavior of public managers. They can communicate explicitly what kind of behavior is expected from subordinates, but mostly they have to develop ways of strengthening to support the expected behaviors. Also, ceremonies, rituals and meetings should be used as symbolic activities that create and transmit certain meanings, including the values of the organization. The public manager becomes a "culture creator" (E. Schein), a leader who serves not only to find new solutions, but also to create some security to civil servants, giving them confidence (Androniceanu, A ., 2004). Public managers must not only be the designers of a system of values based on quality, but the main active militant for the continuously adaptation of the culture to new values, for their integration into the wider context of European cultural values.

That is why it is considered that the key to continuous quality improvement is not technology (Stanciu, I., 2007), but leadership, the true vector of implementing a quality culture. Therefore, it is obvious that a quality culture in an institution or public authority can not be shaped by adopting a passive attitude. It can not be born by itself, but through many outreach activities, training, and especially by motivating staff, by designing well documented organizational structures, able to implement a quality policy in the interest of citizens and the organization itself.

One of the mistakes that many public servants are doing when appointed as the head of a group that they do not know or do not agree, is that they want to change the existing culture. This causes resistance to change, which often leads to the action taken by the manager to fail.

A totally different outcome would be if the manager would seek to know the history and the reason behind the existing culture and, instead of trying to change and impose, would act to improve it. Basically, he needs to attract the leaders, especially informal ones, as they are often those that generate resistance to change.

Quality Culture Versus Ethics for the Civil Servants

The interpretation of the law no. 7/2004 on the Code of Conduct for Public Servants as amended and supplemented, and the Act no. 188/1999 on the Status of Civil Servants also amended and supplemented, but not limited to, the

following general legal principles can be mentioned (Code of Conduct for Civil Servants, 2004):

1. Supremacy of the Constitution and the law;
2. Preeminence of the public interest;
3. Ensuring equal treatment to citizens facing public authorities and institutions, according to which public officials have as a task to apply the same legal status identical in similar situations;
4. Professionalism;
5. Impartiality and independence;
6. Moral integrity;
7. Freedom of thought and expression;
8. Honesty and fairness;
9. Openness and transparency. Principle of respect for the legal regime of conflict of interest and incompatibilities, established by law;
10. Obligation not to prejudice natural or legal persons and defend the prestige of the civil service;
11. Obligation to demonstrate professional discretion with regard to all information and knowledge in the exercise of its functions;
12. Obligation to comply with orders of his immediate superior;
13. Obligation for the senior officials to support motivated proposals and initiatives of subordinate staff in order to improve the work of the authority or institution and the quality of public services provided to citizens;

Most of these principles are inextricably linked with the concept of ethics and quality culture. It is obvious that these principles will never be fulfilled in their integrality, unless they rely on a strong culture of quality in any authority and public institution.

On the other hand, it should be noted that in any kind of organization, ethical behavior is influenced both by the individual factors and social factors. "There should be a trust climate (Stanciu, I., 2007), because it leads to communication on the one hand (they will not accept messages from people who do not trust), and secondly, it may develop positive interpersonal relationships. This will help avoiding conflicts, will enhance work team, but, especially, will lead to ethical behavior of employees and hence the quality of public services. This means orientation (Stanciu, I., 2007) to client-citizen.

We also need to emphasized the fact that the above legal principles lead to an official image integrity with a well-structured system of values, but mostly responsible. Accepting responsibility helps building confidence and integrity, as well as all other elements of ethics, very important element for the implementation of total quality in the public organizations.

Instead of Conclusions…

In order to achieve the implementation of a sound quality culture in the public organizations, it is necessary to first consolidate the value of such systems. I think it is necessary for general value system to be implemented in all institutions or public authorities, and each organization to add their own values after then.

But I also believe that the most important aspect is given by civil servants, as more or less vectors of the authority , which have the most important role in providing public services. They are to be motivated by both as a participatory management and other incentives, including the material.

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RURAL MARKETING TO THE AID OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY - JILAVA COMMUNE, ILFOV COUNTY, ROMANIA

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Abstract

Rural marketing is an indispensible element within the strategies for the economic development of villages and comunes, contributing to the establishing of the strategy overview. Marketing helps villages and comunes fulfill several objectives, such as the attracting of new national or international companies, the consolidation of the industrial infrastructure, tourism development, the diversification and improvement of the transport and health services. The paper at hand presents the modality through which the instruments of public rural marketing influence local economic development, through their impact on the development strategies elaborated by the local communities.

Keywords: rural marketing, strategy, identity and image, local development, vision

1. Introductory considerations regarding public marketing

In order to answer the current rural problems, generated by the rural competition and by the continuous increase of demand for public services and goods, a new manner of governing and administering the villages and communes is necessary, oriented towards the market requirements, towards action and result.

This presupposes a reorientation of the attitude of local authorities from "administration" to "management", borrowing aspects from the philosophy of the private sector.

"Rural marketing", "local economic development", "villages and communes competitiveness" are notions that are many times analyzed separately in the specialty literature. Sometimes, the activities specific to rural marketing are limited only to the promotion policy, minimizing their importance within the local economic development strategies.

In the context of the increased complexity of the current economy, rural functionality can be ensured solely through a well guided marketing process[1] which

[1] At the middle of the 1990's, the use of marketing became frequent within the problematic of the local communities, as a reaction to the deep changes occurred in the strategies of companies and governmental policies, determined by the globalization and regionalization process. This is an important moment for urban marketing, because it begins to be placed and perceived in the wider context of local and regional development. This expansion of the concept of "public marketing" determined the shift in its perception by the business community, the local administrations and the non-profit organizations.

to include several action stages, by formulating goals and strategies regarding the establishing of relations between economic, social and institutional environment, at the level of markets, as well as of relations between demand and supply.

The rural marketing policy comprises the public and the private sector, following that all their activities ensure the conservation, stimulation and integration at all levels, by providing and occupying the corresponding work force, by attracting business from other areas, as well as by developing the existing ones.

Rural policies must be in agreement with the local economy and with the expectations of those operating both within and outside it, the objective being the promotion of local economy. The instrument used in this sense is rural marketing, which aims that all actors of the local economic life are satisfied within the community and the expectations of tourists and investors are answered.

Thus, by means of well oriented actions, the marketing policy[2] may contribute to the improvement of the image of the localities and to the increase of their competitiveness in the context of competition increase at the regional and international level.

Rural marketing presupposes the choice of adequate manner for designing and organizing villages and communes, in order to satisfy the needs of the target segments interested in rural development. It is considered that rural marketing reached its finality when the business community and the citizens are satisfied with the economic-social rural environment, when the expectations of visitors and investors are satisfied.

In the specialty literature, the concept is used as having different connotations, such as:

- rural marketing as promotion of the villages and communes, its characteristics and perspectives, in view of attracting investments and visitors from outside. The product is ready, it must only be packed in the most suitable manner[3].
- rural marketing as alignment of the rural development policies, from the conception to the implementation moments, to the requirements of the local economic factors and to the expectations and hopes of the external factors that must be attracted, for the purpose of promoting local economy, considered as a wellbeing force of the villages and communes.
- rural marketing as total reorganization of the administration and of the planning procedure, focusing on the "customers" for the local "product" (citizens, enterprises, institutions, foreign investors, visitors), judging the

[2] The marketing policy represents an ensemble of strategic objectives, integrated in different managerial instruments operationalized in marketing optic, depending on the conditions offered by the new internal and external collectivity environment.

[3] Although this approach is unanimously criticized, in theory it corresponds quite well to many of the actions put into practice in the name of rural marketing;

results obtained depending on their satisfaction towards the quality and quantity of services and going towards a model in which the relationship between the rural actors is based on negotiation and communication, rather than on regulations and conflict.

At present, rural marketing has become a preeminent characteristic of the local economic development strategy. Local economic development also presupposes the establishing of a long-term marketing strategy, oriented towards the conservation and development of the natural, economic and human potential of the local collectivity.

The context in which rural marketing operates is characterized by the accentuation of competition between the rural communities, in view of attracting human, material and financial capital. Human settlements are in competition for attracting investments, work force, tourists. Thus, similar to private companies, they attempt to determine their position in the country economy and their competitive advantage in comparison with other settlements.

It can be seen the fact that the rural marketing proposals are based on two concepts, differing depending on the localization of the action's centre of gravity. In this sense:

- rural marketing is the instrument that villages and communes use in order to cope with supra-local competition on the human settlements market: a process in which the commune designs the centre of gravity of its political actions with respect to the outside, for the purpose of attracting new actors, capable of supporting the development of the local economy;
- focus is placed on the competition between communes – the most important resource is given by its specific aspects, and the major strong points are given by the existing economic basis;

Rural marketing is used for fulfilling several goals, such as the creation of a positive image for the community, the attraction of companies, institutions, tourists, work force with special abilities, but, as well, they must find markets for their exports, must adopt instruments for strategic marketing management, in view of creating an "rural brand".

The old promotion strategies for the local collectivity are not longer valid in the context of markets in a continuous and rapid change. In order to be actually competitive, these communities must fundament their local development strategies from the perspective of marketing, as well.

Thus, the local actors are determined to take, adapt and adjust techniques and instruments of the marketing of products and services to the rural dimension, for the purpose of attracting tourists, investors, economic agents, residents.

Rural marketing represents a set of activities meant to draw the attention of potential and existing customers to the human settlement, through the use of specific instruments and by means of the coordinated efforts of rural marketing actors.

Therefore, the human settlements is a market, in which supply must satisfy demand; it is a product designed to attract or stimulate a future demand, and, at the administrative level, the human settlement is an enterprise that needs to reorient its actions towards a new conception. This means that the principle of rural marketing must be found in the rural planning process, at the level of formulating the development policies, incorporating in every sectoral policy four determinant aspects which characterize the marketing practice, defined as the four "P":

- Product (the configuration of the human settlement product, what rural products – functions and services there are on the market);
- Position (how the customer reaches the human settlement product, where the rural functions and services are located);
- Price (what is the price of services, the cost of living, taxes, level of incomes, social privileges, cost of land, degree of openness / accessibility of the public authority, degree of investment return, risks associated with running business etc.);
- Promotion (publicity, public relations, communication).

A rural marketing program must start from the premise that each commune is unique and there are no universally valid formulae, and, therefore, the community leaders must identify and capitalize on the uniqueness specific to their settlement. This uniqueness can be given by the natural environment: presence of valuable natural resources, a favourable climate, or the built environment: historical importance architecture, a famous building, or could be the home of a famous celebrity, or even a combination thereof and of other aesthetic values (Dinca, D., Dumitrica, C., 2010).

Many communities wish to build a new image or to replace the negative one.

By means of rural marketing, local communities can be promoted in the same complex manner as any product or service in the private sector.

The marketing instruments can be adapted to the problematic of communities promoting their development potential, for the creation of a "brand supported by a well-individualized identity" (Rainisto, S.K., 2003).

Rural marketing communicates the villages and communes identity such as to be understood by the target segments. By communicating this identity, the villages and communes image is created, which is defining for the manner of perception in the future by the potential actors involved in rural development. Rural marketing thus becomes an indispensible instrument within the strategies for the economic development of villages and communes, contributing to the establishment of the overall vision of the strategy.

The success of rural marketing is conditioned by the direct involvement of several socio-economic actors, as well as by the assurance of a convergence of interests of the main interested factors. An important role is played by the analysis

of the villages and communes life-cycle, which is conditioned by the mobility of the current and potential rural elements.

The success factors of rural marketing explain the reasons why certain villages and communes manage to implement economic development strategies, by using the instruments specific to this marketing specialization.

A marketing success factor can also be considered the villages and communes ability and capacity to identify a problem and to settle it by means of the rural marketing practices.

In the specialty literature there were identified eight success factors that guarantee the success of the specific marketing processes, as follows: the planning group, the strategic vision and analysis, the identity and image, the public-private partnerships, political consensus, the world market and the local development, the fortuitous events of leadership.

In the paper at hand, we will present the development strategy of Jilava Commune, strategy developed by using public marketing instruments, within which we will attempt to identify, to the extent to which they exist, the eight success factors mentioned.

2. General presentation of Jilava Commune

Jilava is a commune in Ilfov County, known especially due to the Jilava penitentiary (official name – Bucharest Penitentiary), one of the largest and most famous in Romania, which was used by the different political regimes for incarcerating political inmates, also know due to the „ Jilava massacre”[4].

Jilava Commune is along the Bucharest-Giurgiu road, 12 km from the Capital's center. The area of the commune is of 2830 ha, out of which 330 ha are occupied by the village settlement, and the rest represent arable land -2026 ha, and non-arable land - 474 ha. Jilava Commune was created by the merger of three villages: Jilava, Mierlari and Odai.

Among the localities in Ilfov County, Jilava Commune is part of the communes with small area, but with high density, industrialized, in which the population active in the industry records values above 50%.

On the territory of the Jilava Commune there are significant oil resources, located at a depth of 600 m. The exploitation of these deposits started in 1970 and it is still continuing today.

On the territory of the Jilava Commune there is one river – Sabar River, to the south-west art of the commune.

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[4] The **Jilava Massacre** was triggered on the night of November 26th to 27th, 1940, when in Jilava penitentiary (official name: « Bucharest Penitentiary ») came a group of armed legionnaires who murdered 64 inmates, high officers and leaders of the Romanian political life between the two World Wars.

In the 2002 census, the population of Jilava Commune was of 11,919 inhabitants, number that in the meantime has decreased. The life expectancy of the inhabitants in the commune is 69 years. The average number of children per family is 2.

Jilava Commune has a millenary history. Archeological research proves that human populations have lived on the territory of the Jilava Commune since the pre-historical times. Following the diggings, important archeological artifacts were brought to light, proving the existence of a human settlement in this area more than 2,000 years before Christ, as well as other important artifacts belonging to the "Gumelnița B"-type culture.

The oldest document known until the present that certifies the existence of Jilava was issued in Bucharest in June 1716, document by means of which "priest Radu from Jilava sells to chancellor Matei Fărcășanu a house with yard and garden". From another document issued 6 years later, also in Bucharest and which mentions the same "priest Radu from Jilava", it is derived that the village belonged to chancellor Constantin II. According to these sources, Jilava village was created during the reign of Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688-1714). Initially, the villages Jilava and Mierlari were set along the Sabar sides. Also there was a church whose traces were still visible before the Second World War. Tradition claims that the waters of Sabar spilled over and flooded the village, so the inhabitants had to move to higher ground. It is possible for this event to have occurred at the beginning of the 19th century, around years 1815-1831, when the current Jilava church was built, and a large number of "ungureni" coming from Ardeal settled here.

In Jilava Commune, the protected areas, from the historical viewpoint, are:

- Holy Emperors Church (1817-1818)
- Assumption of the Virgin Church (1843-1844)
- Radu Vodă drinking fountain
- A settlement from the traco-geto-dacic era

The Orthodox Church "Holy Emperors Constantin and Elena" was built around year 1817 and was declared a category B historical monument. The church stands out with its walls, approximately 80 cm thick, to which is added the neo-Byzantine painting. The church underwent repairing works between the years of 1831 and 1889.

The Orthodox Church Assumption of the Virgin (1843 -1844) is also a historical monument. Renovated relatively recently, the church represents a point of interest for the locals.

Radu Vodă drinking fountain – historical monument located behind the "Assumption of the Virgin" Church. The name comes from the famous ruler Radu Vodă, who was, according to the legend, the founder and first ruler of Țara Românească.

The traco-geto-dacic era settlement brought to life the artifacts of a culture characteristic to the eneolithic era (calcolythic era). The dominant traits of this culture are the ceramic painted with graphite, the tell-type settlements (hills made up of burnt remains of houses, joined together and of remains of all kinds, corresponding to several overlaid Neolithic settlements, destroyed by fire) and the plastic representations made of clay or bone. Two tombs were also discovered, dating from the 3rd-4th century, which the specialists identified as belonging to the free Dacians or Sarmats and one of the 11th century, of a rider with horse who, judging by the inventory (a spear head, an iron bit), did not belong to the locals, but to a Petcheneg.

Another attracting point is represented by Jilava Fort 13, which is part of the fortifications belt of Bucharest, built according to the plans of a famous Belgian military architect, General Henri Alexis Brialmont, starting with year 1884. In its time, the network formed of the 18 forts cost 111.5 million lei in gold, namely three times the annual budget allotted to the Romanian army. The erection of the fortifications belt took more than two decades, the works being particularly complex. The construction of Fort 13 itself is magnificent. Under this aspect, the architects identified it as an architectural work worthy of the Renaissance era, even if the Fort was erected closer to our time. They indicated that the Fort can be included without reticence among the Romanian architectural monuments. Dating from the second half of the 19th century, Jilava was used as a place of political imprisonment since the times of King Carol II, but only as transit prison, the living conditions being virtually unbearable. The communist regime turned it into a prison for time served, numerous political inmates spending there up to 5 or more years, sentenced to a slow and sure death. In the same penitentiary of Jilava executions took place, in an area called the "Valley of the Peaches".

In the 1980's, the commune was part of Bucharest Sector 4, hence a neighbourhood of the capital. In the 1990's, it was a distinct administrative territorial unit, with its own local authorities. During this period, as development level, it was close to the nearby localities – a peri-urban area of the capital, semi-industrialized, with population mainly occupied in the local and the capital's industry.

At a distance of 18 years – 2008, lagging is noticed, from the development viewpoint, comparatively to the nearby localities – limited number of jobs, population engaged in economic activities on the territory of other administrative territorial units, absence of public utility networks – sewerage, gas supply, water supply, bad roads, absence of health endowments and infrastructure, inadequate educational spaces, all these in spite of the fact that the local budget was above the national average for communes. The essential causes of this state of fact were represented by the lack of performance of the local authorities during the period 1990-2008.

3. The planning group. The strategic approach


The planning group[5] is a structure responsible for the planning and execution of the specific rural marketing processes.

In year 2009 an ample commune modernization and development process was commenced. In the first stage, a study was executed, with respect to the perception with regard to the commune. The study was run on three levels:

- population of the City of Bucharest. 231 persons were interviewed, inhabitants of the City of Bucharest, targeting:
  - The degree of knowledge of the localities in Ilfov County, including Jilava Commune;
  - The association elements with these localities;
  - Attractiveness for living;
  - Attractiveness for economic activities.
- the quasi-entirety of employees within Jilava Commune town hall, the dimensions of the research correlating the following major directions:
  - Identification of local problems;
  - Characterization of the activity of public administration – relevant aspects, their hierarchy;
  - Description of the quality of life within Jilava Commune.
- population of Jilava Commune. 232 persons were interviewed, inhabitants of the commune, targeting:
  - The hierarchy of the local problems;
  - Formulation of expectations towards the activity of local public administration.


[5] The composition of this group presents certain particularities depending on the characteristics of the administrative system. Thus, if in the American system this group is made up of representatives of the public and private sectors, in Europe, the participants are the representatives of the public institutions with local and regional authority. In this last case, the planning group is supported by an external consultant and by the representatives of the local economic agents. In the international practice of urban marketing, it is recommended the use of the special planning group, which has as main tasks: defines and diagnoses the main problems faced by the villages and communes (the SWOT analysis), establishes the vision of urban economic development on the basis of the analysis performed, identifies the economic sectors most suitable for the urban community, recommends improvements of the infrastructure and territory arranging;

Figure 1: The Strategic Approach



Source: D. Dinca (coordinator) – Development strategy of Jilava Commune, 2010.


Figure 2. Knowledge of localities in Ilfov County



Source: D. Dinca (coordinator) – Development strategy of Jilava Commune, 2010

From the study it was derived that, from the localities of Ilfov County, Jilava has the highest degree of knowledge – 100%, followed by Glina (85%), Măgurele, Domneşti and Afumati with 80% each. Hence, in comparison to other localities in Ilfov, Jilava is a known one, which represents a strong point, but, at the following question, (What do you associate the identified localities with?), the explanation for this fact emerged:

Figure 3. Identification elements for Jilava



Source: D. Dinca (coordinator) – Development strategy of Jilava Commune, 2010

So, Jilava is a very well-known locality, but it identifies by means of the penitentiary.

The fact that it is located in the immediate vicinity of the City of Bucharest has always represented an advantage for Jilava. The commune inhabitants had the possibility to work in the enterprises of the capital and, more recently, a series of investments were drawn to Jilava. Still, the predominant perception is that of a locality to the south of the capital, where there are a „famous prison and several factories".

There are very few people, even among the locals, who know the history of Jilava Commune, who know about the existence of an archeological site on the territory of this locality or who found out about the existence of historical monuments. This lack of information and distorted perception regarding Jilava is also due to the lack of interest of the local authorities, which concerned themselves more or less with other aspects and almost not at all with the commune image.

An analysis of the current situation in the commune reveals a series of other aspects with character of need and/or constraint:

- relatively obsolete economic structure;
- absence of any forms of local marketing;
- reduced budgetary resources, compared to the need for investments in marketing;
- absence of connections with the domestic and foreign touristic circuit;
- inexistence of presentation and promotion materials for the historical monuments and touristic sites;
- generally low level of awareness within the community with respect to the importance of hospitality and tourism;
- exodus of the qualified work force to the capital.

Considering the above-mentioned facts, the problem identified is the distorted image with respect to Jilava Commune, existing among the large public, fact which leads to the association of the locality with an area on the outskirts of the capital, lacking any attractiveness.

This fact makes difficult the construction of an identification element with positive impact, because it is one of historical nature, imprinted in the collective conscience. From this point of view, it is necessary to have a strategic decision which to presuppose:

- the formulation of another element that the locality can identify with and its promotion, such as, in time, the present negative impact of the penitentiary to fade away by ignoring it,
- the establishing of an identification element, built in antithesis with the current one;
- the undertaking of this identification element and the construction of the development strategy around this "celebrity point".

- The local authorities chose variant number 1, which was at the basis of elaborating the locality's development strategy.

4. Vision and Strategic Analysis. The Local Development Strategy.

Vision in rural marketing represents the future projections of the competitive position held by the villages and communes on the market. Strategic analysis presupposes the detailed examination of the information regarding the elements of the strategic process. The implementation of a strategic market plan for a community is more difficult than in the case of private companies. Strategic market planning will not be successful in case of communities where the different interests were not brought to a consensus. In this sense, an essential role in the outlining of a development strategy based on the public marketing instruments will be represented by the political consensus[6]. It represents the agreement between the political decision-makers with respect to the management of the public. At the municipality level there may exist conflicts of interests, which may compromise the rural development efforts. The strategic planning process is operational if these interests are in consensus and there is a single decisional structure. The decisional process in rural marketing must not be divided into several parts, depending on the actors involved.

The local development strategy of Jilava Commune constitutes the framework within which the integrated and harmonious development will be achieved, in the following years, in view of improving the quality of life of the inhabitants. This framework uses both public and private interests, due to the preservation and improvement of the elements of economic, social and environmental nature, essential for the long-term prosperity of citizens and trading companies. Strategy is an instrument that guides and integrates the local development efforts of the entire community. Thus, the participation and cooperation of all citizens, of the public, private and social sectors, of the local actors and opinion-makers, are essential for a successful putting into practice. Given the extended period of time to which the document refers, it was suggested a list of priorities regarding the directions of action and the investments with significant impact on the economic and social development, from domestic (local budget, public-private partnerships) or foreign (state budget, structural funds, foreign credits etc.) sources, for the purpose of ensuring the basic conditions (infrastructure, environmental protection, community and commune administration services) upon which the commune will develop in the future.

In grounding the paper, we started from the elements specific to Jilava Commune, from the economic, demographic data, infrastructure, environment, territory arranging, distribution of services etc., as well as from a rigorous evaluation

[6] This element suggests the strong presence of the policies element in urban marketing.

of the manner in which the local community wishes to evolve. There were integrated strategic elements which observe, take into account and integrate elements from the county, regional, sectoral and national programs, as well as the commitments undertaken by Romania in the negotiations with the European Union. The strategy was elaborated with the contribution of the community, of the clerks within local administration, of the local economic agents, institutions and organizations, by means of surveys, community consultations and public debates which joined the community in an exercise of participative democracy and collective effort for designing their own future.

Hence, from the methodological point of view, the strategy has at basis and is grounded in the following instruments and work procedures:

- content analysis;
- analysis of statistical data from organized sources;
- comparison of statistical data on the evolution scale;
- interviews with the local actors of development;
- SWOT analysis;
- analysis and interpretation of studies, reports, researches, strategies and regulations local, county, regional, national and European studies, reports, researches, strategies and regulations.

The local development strategy identified a clear and comprehensive vision on the future – the status in which the community wishes to become at the end of the planning period – and establishes the objectives by means of which this vision will be accomplished. The principles and ways of actions for reaching the objectives are structured such as to allow the actors, the organizations and the citizens its putting into application, to coordinate the efforts and to collaborate to the benefit of the entire community, with the synergic use of all resources, knowledge and local will. The strategy implementation element is represented by the set of projects describing recommendations, time planning, resources and necessary steps, as well as a series of indicators facilitating progress measurement in implementing the strategy. A system of periodical monitoring and review allows the adaptation of the strategy to the new states of fact of the commune, installed following the implementation of the actions, as well as the involvement of new legislative provisions or modifications of the national strategies (Dinca, D., 2010).

For an adequate putting into practice of the strategy, the following conditions must be observed:

- approval and support from the local council and the community;
- support from the private sector, especially of the economic component;
- permanent informing of the community with respect to the application progress;
- permanent monitoring of the stage of reaching the proposed objectives.

5. Marketing plan

The marketing plan was established around the following requirements, exigencies:

- Justification of the specific product/event that makes the object of the promotion
- Specificity of the specific product/event promoted, competitive market in the touristic field in the respective area, range of touristic products / events offered/organized in the area.
- SWOT analysis of the tourism in the area (with focus on the degree of accessibility to the specific product/event promoted, facilities offered in the other, other touristic products offered in the area, the existence of touristic information centers in the area, other relevant elements.)
- Current market analysis (number of tourists per year - foreign/Romanians, categories of tourists, average stay in the area, existing housing facilities, season dependency of tourism in the area, categories of tourism practiced in the area, other touristic facilities offered in the area, periodical cultural events etc.)
- Presentation of the current situation with respect to the number of tourists attracted by the specific product/event and grounding the increase of the number of tourists as a consequence of implementing the project proposed for financing
- Setting the general marketing objectives
- Strategies for the implementation of the general marketing objectives
- Action plan for implementing the marketing strategies
- Plan budget (correlated with the activities in the action plan).
- Results expected.

6. Accessing funds structural for local promotion

Another important factor within marketing strategies is represented by the world market and local development. Any marketing strategy must take into account the fact that villages and communes must participate in the international competition for attracting resources or winning markets, while local development indicates the importance the municipality must give to local development, in order to be a strong competitor on the international market.

The marketing strategy must, therefore, target the accessing of financial resources, in order to apply it. These resources can come from the local budget or can be accessed from the structural funds made available in this sense.

Even small communities can establish their own market niche where to be superior to the other communities. In this situation, the municipality must know very well what is its competitive position, in order to not set unrealistic development objectives.

Already having two important work instruments – the Development strategy and the Marketing plan of the locality, in year 2011 a financing application was submitted, in view of accessing a fund from the Regional Operational Program, Priority axis 5 – Sustainable development and the promotion of tourism, Major intervention field 5.3 – Promotion of the touristic potential and creation of the necessary infrastructure, for the purpose of increasing Romania's attractiveness as touristic destination, Operation Development and consolidation of domestic tourism by supporting the promotion of specific products and by means of specific marketing activities.

The activities proposed were the following:

- Promotion campaign for the specific touristic products in Jilava;
- Execution and broadcasting of a promotion video for the specific touristic products in Jilava;
- Creation and permanent updating of a bilingual web portal for the promotion of specific touristic products;
- Online promotion of the specific touristic products;
- Execution and distribution of promotional materials;
- Outdoor Publicity;
- Marketing activities for the promotion of touristic products in Jilava;
- Marketing study elaboration;
- Design, construction and arranging of a presentation stand for tourism fairs;
- Actions of participation to the tourism fairs in the country;
- Direct marketing activities;
- Informing and publicity activity;
- Press ads;
- Press conferences;
- Organization of specific cultural and artistic events;
- Activity of internal monitoring and evaluation;

7. The promotion campaign for the specific touristic products in Jilava

The locality identity and image are elements that help in the creation of the community brand. It is impossible to create an image of the commune without establishing at the strategic level the content of the rural identity. With the clear establishing of the identity desires, the major elements of the image are formulated. The future local image will be set by the planning group, if the rural marketing has an efficient communication system.

The local identity represents the manner in which it wishes to be perceived. This represents a unique set of relations between the composing elements, being a sum of its characteristics, which differentiate it from the other villages and communes. Identity is the result of the activities planned within the rural marketing programs.

There are three levels of identity: location personality, location identity, location image. The differences between the three levels represent the opportunities for improving the relations and for restarting the villages and communes life-cycle.

An important element in view of developing the image of a locality is represented by the promotion campaigns.

The promotion campaign of the touristic products has as primordial objective the attention bringing of the wide public, but especially of tourists, with respect to the touristic potential Jilava Commune has and, on the other hand, it attempts to change the perception of the wide public with respect to Jilava locality, by its unique association with the Jilava Penitentiary. The campaign attempts to promote Jilava Commune through its specific touristic products, such as: Holy Emperors Constantin and Elena Church, category B historical monument, dated 1817, Assumption of the Virgin Church, category B historical monument, dated 1843, Radu Voda drinking fountain behaving this church and Fort XIII, touristic objective.

The development and permanent updating of a bilingual web portal for the promotion of the touristic products will represent a second stage within the promotion campaign.

The project team will create a brief of the web portal with promotion information of the touristic products, with the following structure:

- Information about the history, culture, art, cults - churches, religious holidays and traditional customs of the Jilava community;
- Presentation of the specific touristic products of the area: Holy Emperors Constantin and Elena Church, category B historical monument, dated 1817, Assumption of the Virgin Church, category B historical monument, dated 1843, Radu Voda drinking fountain behaving this church and Fort XIII, touristic objective;
- Information with respect to the access paths to these historical monuments;
- A presentation section, of the project, the institution implementing the project and the financer;
- A section with photographs and images of the monuments, as well as videos from different local events;
- A feedback section where the tourists who visited these beautiful historical monuments to be able to post their impressions or recommendations;
- A contact section by means of which the interested parties will be able to gather more information regarding the opportunities for spending their free time in the area of the Jilava Commune;
- Within this promotion campaign, there will be executed a series of promotional materials that will support the campaign in its entirety and, thus, will constitute promotion means of the touristic products on the

long term. The promotional materials to be executed within the project will be divided into two categories:

a. project presentation materials[7]
b. promotion materials of the specific touristic products of Jilava Commune

The second category of materials that will be elaborated under the campaign umbrella is that of the promotional materials for the specific touristic products of the Jilava area. In this category will fall the following:

- Photo albums with the historical monuments in Jilava Commune: Holy Emperors Constantin and Elena Church, Assumption of the Virgin Church, Radu Voda drinking fountain and Fort XIII, touristic objective; they will contain relevant images from inside and outside the churches, of the Radu Voda drinking fountain and Fort XIII, touristic objective;
- 3 Brochures with themes, regarding the above-mentioned historical monuments, religious holidays, gastronomy, local events;
- Post cards with images of the historical monuments in the area; the most interesting images of the historical monuments will be illustrated and distributed with different occasions and during the tourism fairs;
- Publicity flyers, will contain short information about the historical monuments of the area, high attractiveness publicity messages, and will be distributed in intense traffic areas;
- Promotion flyers (bilingual) which will be available in the touristic information points in the country, within tourism agencies, hotels, airport and train station and at the tourism fairs in Romania;
- Touristic CD-s and DVD-s, key-chains and magnets, with images and information about the historical monuments of the area;
- Elements of the Outdoor publicity will also be present. The activity will consist in the design, printing, production, mounting and outdoor services of three street panels that will have the primary goal of promoting the touristic products specific to Jilava Commune and to bring attention of tourists in transit on the existence of the historical monuments in the area.

After the completion of the activities for the execution of the promotional materials for the specific touristic products of Jilava Commune, the marketing activity will start, characterized by an aggressive character which to contribute to the increase of notoriety of the specific touristic products of Jilava Commune: Holy

[7] In the category of project presentation materials, a poster and a flyer will be executed, which will contain: the *project presentation flyer* will include relevant information about the project, the institution implementing the project and the financer; a number of 1500 coopies will be printed; the project *promotion poster,* which will illustrate in an attractive manner the message of the entire project; printed in 500 copies;

Emperors Constantin and Elena Church, Assumption of the Virgin Church, Radu Voda drinking fountain and Fort XIII, touristic objective; they will contain relevant images from inside and outside the churches, of the Radu Voda drinking fountain and Fort XIII, touristic objective.

Design, construction and arranging of presentation stands for the tourism fairs will also represent one of the activities part of the marketing strategy.

The activity of participating to the tourism fairs in the country will have the role of ensuring a continuous promotion of the specific touristic products of Jilava area, their increase of notoriety and, not lastly, the attraction of a number as high as possible of tourists in the area. On the basis of the conclusions mentioned in the marketing study, a calendar will be drafted, of participations to these fairs, the most adequate presentation and promotion manner of the specific products will be selected, using the presentation stand designed and built within the project.

8. Direct marketing activities

Within this activity there will be considered the performing of a series of direct marketing actions which to target specifically the public which we address in this promotion campaign within the project. All direct marketing actions will use all informational and promotional sources and resources executed within the project until that time. The direct marketing actions that will be executed within this sub-activity will be the following:

- Online marketing, via the web portal lists of addressees will be accessed directly, persons who will become potential;
- The flyers executed within the project will be distributed directly to the beneficiaries (potential tourists) in areas of intense traffic, such as: metro, hypermarkets or pedestrian areas in Bucharest, in areas of intense traffic;
- Promotional flyers (bilingual) will be distributed directly to the headquarters of representative institutions with high traffic of persons;
- The publicity flyers and the promotional flyers will be distributed to all touristic information centers existing, in the airport and in hotels
- Key-chains, magnets, post cards, photo albums, thematic brochures will be distributed directly to the beneficiaries (tourists) visiting the two churches, the Radu Voda drinking fountain and Fort XIII, touristic objective, as well as in the two press conferences and the special artistic cultural events organized at the level of the Jilava community;
- CD-s, DVD-s will be distributed by means of a publication in the written press, institution with which the project team will sign a distribution contract. The publication in the written press by means of which the CD-s and DVD-s will be distributed will be selected during the project implementation, depending on the respective context.

9. Conclusions – results

The success of the marketing strategy in this case is directly related to the locality's decisional capacity. In case of rural marketing, leadership represents the general capacity of the municipality to coordinate the complex processes of this specialized marketing field, to establish strategies and to obtain the organizational power. The municipality must involve all interested factors, such as they accept the decisions.

At the end of year 2011, the financing application was approved, the financing contract was concluded and the running of the activities proposed started. Although in an incipient stage of executing the local marketing activities, the first results emerged, essential for the approach of the local authorities, to build a new identity for the commune by executing a new identification element. Thus, a proposal of the Romanian Golf Federation emerged, to build on the commune terrain a field with international homologation, the only one of this type in Romania. The investment value exceeds 20 million Euros. At this moment, a partnership has already been concluded between the commune, the Federation and a company providing financing. Thus, during a relatively short time – 2009-2012, by using local marketing and strategic planning as essential action instruments, a locality with an identity hostile to investments and attraction for living, managed to identity a new image and assimilation element – golf, which, in time, may fade the current, negative, image, given by a historical nature element – the penitentiary.

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REGIONALISM AND ITS SHELTERS. THE PROBES OF THE COLD WAR ERA AND THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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Daniela-Anamaria Radu

Abstract:

Nowadays, the world`s stares of wonderment revolve around how successful regional actors have become in channeling the regional organizations they created in envisioning a set of prescriptions for a law-abiding regional conduct. Many of the regional products of today`s were blueprinted by the socialization of normative convergence of former periods. Our article is not intended to disseminate on-look perspectives upon the state of the regional security environment in different parts of the world, nor to disseminate the anemoscope of how wide the regional organizations have shot in furnishing the appropriate results for the regional security environment.

Our purposeful aim is to deliver an extradite of how regionalism has been bestowed upon an attendant position in global arena, by juxtaposing the Cold War Era and the post-Cold War Era. We jibed the agreement that transitive acquiescing has been performed between the two types of regionalism during these two time-frames. Also, we account for the consideration that regionalism enlarges on the expatiations of compounded interestingness between the actors, geographically encroached into a regional area, which entertain topics of engagement, based on a considerable amount of concern with each other and on an equivalency of interest in a plurality of security situations.

Keywords: Regionalism, Old Regionalism, New Regionalism.

Eye-shot on the Conspicuous Make-Up of Regionalism in the Cold War Era

Research conducted on regional security dynamics has found new sources of inspiration and has embarked on a very insightful scientific venture. The *Old Regionalism* of *the Cold War Era* has collapsed with the emergence of the unipolar momentum. In order to prepare for all of the eventual leaps and evolutions assumed by this article we have enclosed in this section a modest radiograpghy of some of the relevant research we have gone through up to now for the cognizance of *regionalism in the Cold War Era*. The literature concerning the growing complexity of regional security and emergent regional security structures, in particular, has not been abundant. The systemic security theories, in *the Cold War Era*, regarded the regional level as easily penetrable by the two omnipresent global actors – United States and the Soviet Union - and, hence, did not gratify it with an independent status. Global interventions were the main modifiers of the regional security dynamics and *a self-propelled regional order* was, by all means, an unthinkable hypothesis. The

main argument was, that, ever since Westphalia, the systemic level has exerted a strategic dominance over the sub-systemic level: "the regional level was structurally open to global interventions" (Kelly:2007).Virtually unable to oppose the systemic pressures, the sub-systemic actors had to accommodate to the globally stirred regional architectures. Creating stable regional environments was an outcome only the two superpowers could help provide.




Figure 1: Old Regionalism's Chandelier (apud Kelly:2007);

As shown in the above figure, the relationship between the primary system and the regional subsystems was a relationship of *subordination*. The *global-regional interaction* was not shaped by the regional, domestic evolution, nor was it mutually oriented. It was characterized by *a policy of a regional profound engagement* from the primary system that purposefully conditioned and defined all interactional variables. Regional assertiveness was highly unlikely to grow exponentially as the two superpowers anxiously debated which new regions to add to their spheres of influence. Therefore, the primary system posed an absolute threat to the ascending regional orders.

In the Cold War Era, regions were cartographically identified! Undoubtedly, The European Community stood out as an example of a region which has surpassed the traditional determinants of geographical proximity and developed its *regionness* – its own *regional identity* shaped by a wider range of factors than geography: *regional economic integration*, *regional political integration*, *legislative normative convergence*, *normative socialization*. As a result, regions, in the *Old Regionalism*, regions remained very poorly theorized. Nonetheless, some theoretical attempts distinguished themselves more than others. Hass's *neofunctionalist theory* proved to be a vigorous counter-example of the systemic theories: "*neofunctionalism* looked for spillover and

integration, but found instead clubs of dictators and decay" (Hass:1964). Evidently, there were many disagreements regarding the instruments employed in defining a region and admitting new members in the already established regions. Even though geographic density remained a key vector in the definition process, additional variables were acknowledged.

When asking the question if there were trends, during *the Cold-War Era*, that manifested towards the disconnection from the global pressures, accelerating regionally, one can answer *yes*. It is not the purpose of this article to parcel of bi-section to what happened in Europe and what happened in other parts of the world[1]. If we are to refer to the critical issues of agenda-setting and to the transitional phases towards this kind of liberty, no-one can deny that Europe ranked first! The trend in favor of independent policies was set by Europe. Other parts of the World – most especially Africa and Asia – defined their security objectives, at first, as a concession to negating oppressive forms of extra-regional meddling – such as: *neo-colonialism* and *neo-imperialism*.[2]

William Thompson: 1973 (Thompson: 1973);	**Kenneth Waltz: 1979 (Waltz:1979);**	**Barry Buzan: 1986 (Buzan: 1986);**
Regular and intense interactions;	Anarchy;	Border;
Geographic proximity;	Polarity;	Anarchy;
Actors recognition of the region as a distinct area;		Polarity;
A minimum of two actors;		Social Construction;

Table 1: Proeminent contributions in the study of regional security characteristics in the Cold War Era;

Overlaying of the regional system by the primary system was a uni-dimensional process, which influenced the future evolutions of regional power establishments. The regional security frameworks geographically identified in the Cold War Era were: *Africa*, *the Middle East*, *East Asi* and *South Asia*. These regions were thought to possess a very relative autonomy-generated regional dynamics and the integration process from within was considered an attempt to stabilize the turbulent domestic arenas in the wake of de - colonization.

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[1] Such a bi-section would be more accurately given by specialists administering area studies, as a comparative analysis of regional, autonomous usages of security practices and ideas of security arrangements, would traverse plenty of innate exemplifications;

[2] They usually came in Western versions; One of the main glistering initiatives that was entertained by regional actors was the *Non-Aligned Movement* – whose first formal Summit was held no sooner than 1961, while the idea for its organization was masterminded during *the Bandung Conference of 1955*; This produced inspirations for many regional initiatives in the non-European security space;

Feature Patterns of Regionalism in the Post-Cold War Era

In *the post-Cold War Era*, the systemic level is no longer viewed as the chief catalyst of the *regional order* and the regional systems and subsystems have developed strategic capabilities to resist the primary system's unilateral pressures. We address the construction of concept of *regional order* as the compartimentalization of specific engagements, whose orientation and instrumentation are directed towards a strategy of accommodation of interests and selection of objectives. By contrast, *world order* is not in the same disposition of placement as regional order is. Within *world order*, the accommodation process is not a covenant of dealings of all the actors, participating on the global arena. It is likely that the actors – partaking in a regional security-setting – have a similar share of influence[3]..

More often than not, the primary system is not as keen on intervening and influencing all the regional institutional settlements as in the Cold War period. This kind of systemic behavior is considered *unipolar passivism* – which is the systemic hegemon's unwillingness to control even the remotest systemic areas and engage into full dominance. In the past decades, regionalists have delineated some answers for this new turning point in International Relations Studies.

First of all, the world's remaining superpower after the Cold War, the United States does not have at its disposal excessive resources to waste. This situation applies to great powers, also. Actually, the United States and the world's great powers are more likely to concentrate their resources on intervention ventures in regions that fall into their most focal spheres of interest[4], rather than on regions that do not bear the same strategic importance. To prevent the dilution of force projecting capacities, there is an evident *great power retrenchment* from the regions (apud Lemke:2002).

Secondly, *territoriality* and *geographic juxtaposition* are still an undisputed trademark of world affairs. States are more interested in interacting and perpetuating positive links with their close neighbors, rather than initiating avenues of security and cooperation with *distant states* (apud Kelly:2007). This also stands for conflicting relationships and tensioned inter-state relations. Disagreements and conflicts can more frequently escalate between neighboring states.

Thirdly, the regional security dynamics has an unprecedented intensity. The fixed geographical references that states have can, first of all, be enhanced, enlarged, reduced or updated through interactions with bordering states, or with states pertaining to the same region.

Fourthly, great power interventions in regional security dynamics are often mediated by regional actors. In order to establish a new regional order, reinforce

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[3] The share of influence may not be equal, but, undoubtedly the level is comparable to the set off of the ambit of world/global influence;

[4] Regions that seem attractive because of their economic potential or regions with which the bilateral dialogue has been more intense;

an already existent fragile regional order, re-instate norms and principles eradicated by revisionist endogenous powers or promote their own interests, great powers need regional support. This support can best be acquired through regional alliances or through bilateral relations with those states that have the most preponderant influence upon order-producing concerns.

Fifthly, systemic theories are lacking the specificity that regional theories encompass. The systemic theories of the *Old Regionalism* – *Imperialism* and *Colonialism* – did not consider the fact that world regions may develop an autonomous security dynamics, nor the fact that preferences could be transmitted bi-directionally and only unilaterally. One of the central arguments of my thesis is that neither the systemic theories, nor the regional theories can be independently verifiable. In the *New Regionalism*, the involvement of the regional community in the global dimension is manifest and does not replicate the posture of the old one. Regions offer a major point of reliance for formulating new conceptual insights for global theories and are ostensibly geared to have an important say in the global arena, especially as far as protecting regional security regimes.

Sixthly, there is an increased need for *eclectic regional theories* (apud Kelly:2007). Regionalists consider that the post-Cold War Era is the perfect moment for launching new theories for regional analysis that can comprehensively describe regional behaviors, instead of downscaling systemic theories. The new theories should be aimed at incorporating all the essential elements of *regionalism* and *regionalization*[5] that the abstracting systemic theories failed to decipher. It is highly important for the new regional theories to endorse the non- European regional experiences and to facilitate "*a less static perspective upon regional security*"(apud Acharya, Stubbs:2006).

With that end in view, Amitav Acharya points out that through the importance attached to norms, identity and institution-building processes, a *Participatory Regionalism* is going to advance. The *Participatory Regionalism* will represent a core indicator of the way social movements and epistemic communities are taken into account in the study of regional security. *The concept of region* is seeking to include parameters which exceed the security-political axis: *identity*, *economic interaction* or *externalities referring to the global and regional security architecture*. The operational readiness of the usage of all these new parameters generates *the multidimensionality of the New Regionalism*. Whether scarcely or obviously in some circumstances, these vectors typify the clear outset of the regions of the *New Regionalism*. In contrast with the *old regionalism*, the *New Regionalism* accentuates two categories of regions. *Physical regions* are regions that can be pinpointed on a map and for which spatial interactions are favored by geographic closeness. *Functional regions*

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[5] Understood as the interconnected process of delineating the strong regional focus that the norms and principles traced by *regionalism* are committed to;

represent a collection of different states that overcome geographic barriers and that are structurally prone to interaction even with states with which they do not share borders. The impetus for interaction is not dissipated in view of mutual interaction preferences, unity of interests in foreign policy projects or economic endeavors. The table below reveals some theories *of the New Regionalism*, praised by the scientific community for their innovative content.

Barry Buzan and the theory of regional security complexes (Buzan: 2000)	**Lake and the theory of security externalities (Lake:1997)**	**Lemke and the transition of power in the Third World - (Lemke: 2002)**	**Critical theory and regional integration (Björn: 1999)**	**Inductive approaches (Shambugh: 2005)**
Security dilemmas are much harsher in the case of actors engaged in a relationship of territorial proximity;	Regions are not historical or geographical creations, but elevate around security externalities;	Regions are smaller and parallel international systems;	Regionalism can be used to pacify conflicting geopolitical spaces;	A theory building approach based on the prevalence of weak states;
Regions are mini-anarchies;	Regions designate a set of states, affected by a local or a trans-border externality that arises from a certain geographic area;	The regional level has multiple hierarchies;	Regionalism is a tool for re-enacting regional identity and coherence;	An innovative theoretical addition: state strength instead of state power;
Regions can enrich, but not revolutionize International Relations Studies;	Regions can gradually expand and fulfill functional characteristics;	The hierarchies are pyramid-shaped and vertically distributed;	Regionalism is in stark relatedness with multilateralism and global governance;	State strength entails state's coherence and institutional performance;
Regions composed of weak states characterize proto-security complexes;	Geographic delimitations are not considered;	Regional hierarchies have the same structural traits as the global system;	A Defensive Regionalism against a Systemic Hegemonism;	Regionalization without integration;

Table 2: Proeminent contributions in the study of regional security in the post-Cold War Era (apud Kelly:2007);

While the *Old Regionalism* collapsed under the bi-polar resurgence in the 1970's and 1980's, the *New Regionalism* has to confront and overpass other important challenges. *Globalization* and *unipolarism* are the principal menaces to developing autocephalous regional orders. *Globalization* brings with it homogeneity and the sub-systemic import of only one model of statecraft and statist organization: the occidental one. The autochthonous register is unfairly dismissed or under-appreciated, thus backfiring unsuccessful emendations of regional orders. In spite of the current *unipolar passivism*, the possibility of a *unipolar resurrection* is not to be disregarded. The installation of an updated hegemonic ruling is not a bright prospect for the regional emergent security structures that are now forging.




Figure 2: A possible configuration of the New Regionalism;

The configuration of *the New Regionalism* sketched out in *figure 3* is only a possible formula. In the scientific literature surrounding *the New Regionalism*, the rival theoretical claims have traced opposing views. My configuration invokes the basic tenets of inductive approaches and the inferential constructivist discourses. In a brief explanation, the regional subsystems of *the New Regionalism* are no longer in an embryonic stage of development and can sustain trans-regional interactions. Trans-regional interactions are not monopolized by the primary system and the regional subsystems have a visible security identity that allows them to peculiarly produce regional agency.

Concluding Remarks: The Wear and Display of Marked Peculiarities

The lineaments presented by the authors throughout this article have only been intended to portray the properties and specialties of the feature patterns of *regionalism* during the two main periodic instantiations integrated by security studies: *the Cold-*

War Era and the *post-Cold War Era*. We have suggested that the individual nature of *regionalism* has emerged in the *Post-Cold War Era*. This does not mean that prominent attributes of *regionalism* around the world did not develop in the *Cold War Era*. But, they did not run the full-length features that regional orders were able to handhold. These features did grow, progress and unfold in the *Post-Cold War Era*. The hold on the sub-regional security systems by the two super-powers, in *the Cold War Era*, was relentless. Both of them were masked vigilantes, influencing the finale of regional conflicts, by choosing one side, in the detriment of another. Many regional leaders were saddled with the unpleasantness of the patron-role that the extra-regional actors were playing upon the regional orders of the geographical space, imbued with their own physical and geographical coordinates. At first, at the beginning of the Cold War, some regional leaders found the offer – of security guarantee- put forward by the two superpowers, unpalatable. This is how *the Non-Aligned Movement* was born[6]. In *the post-Cold War Era*, the actors, that had a former invisible global reach, would assume a wide-focus of options for their foreign policies[7]. *The post-Cold Era* allowed a focus-shift. We also called in the affidavit, although in no stark formulations, that the warranty of *identity-building* could not have been realized in *the Cold War Era*. *Identity-building* is a self-supporting averment for the corroboration of quasi-monomorphous indistinguishability of purpose, of character of action, of the deliberately-agreed outline of the process of idea-acknowledgment between two or several actors. On a regional-basis, *identity-building* would require more than two actors that would delineate the patterns of steady conformance between intent, judgment, action and interaction. Without the operating distress of super-power involvement, similarity between the regional actors blossomed and I currently blossoming, until it can become character-claimed[8].

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[6] The bloodline of the non-aligned states was branded in 1955, during *the Asia-Africa Conference*, held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955; The participating countries issued a strong, collective statement against all forms of *colonialism*, of the continuous stream of influences not only from superpowers, but from great powers as well; No-one could be ignorant of the global race for power and domination that did not achieve its peak at that time, but that was accelerating all too rapidly, forcing other actors to take extreme measures; *The Non-Aligned Movement* can be construed as an extreme measure; It reaffirmed the consistent support for an independent path for smaller actors, a path that could be conceived, within their own independent judgment; At a time when in Asia and Africa, the former European colonial powers were trying to re-impose their regional presence without the self-imposition of due restraint from the outer elements, actors situated on a global fringe, decided that their presence in the world order that was laying open, would not be concluded to a pawn-status;

[7] Regional actors, after the Cold War ended, were not left with a done-up position on the global arena; They had to put in a proper, systematic order security arrangements, and fasten associations with extra-regional actors, without the duress of superpower persuasion; The scope of choice was larger and more propounding;

[8] Regional politics did not become monococt during *the Cold-War Era* – intra-regional divisions co-existed with cooperative enterprise; Superpower extra-regional influences gathered into a mass of influxes that instigated sectionalisation of interests –regional actors would, at times, decide to trust

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more the superpower security proposals than rely on their regional counterparts, as those proposals would bring them more advantages.

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